On Appeal from the 380th Judicial District Court Collin County
The appellant attended a party at the appellee’s house during which the appellee gave the appellant a tour of the house. During the tour, the appellant was injured after falling on the steps leading to the wine cellar. The appellant sued the appellee as well as the contractor that built the house and sold it to the appellee. The appellant alleged that she was on the appellee individual’s premises as a licensee to attend a party. Without providing the appellant any warning “of the conditions which posed an unreasonable risk of harm,” the appellee individual allegedly led the appellant to a narrow, dark stairway that went down into the wine cellar. The appellant asserted that the stairway was defectively designed and constructed by the appellee contractor. The appellant asserted a negligence claim against the appellees and a negligence per se claim against the appellee contractor. The appellees filed a combined traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions for summary judgment without stating the basis for doing so. Applying general negligence principles to this case, the appellate court concluded that the duty owed to the appellant, whether by the premises owner, the appellee individual or by the appellee contractor, who allegedly created a dangerous condition, was the duty owed to a licensee. Further, in her petition, the appellant alleged that the stairway was unreasonably dangerous because it did not have a handrail, contained steps that were irregular, and was not sufficiently lighted. The appellant’s summary evidence established there were approximately five steps from the top of the wine cellar to the bottom. Standing on the landing at the top of the stairway, it was clear the stairway curved to the right and the width of the steps varied to compensate for the curve. The appellant testified that when she entered the stairway, she was aware of the poor lighting and the lack of a handrail. She also testified the steps were uneven. The appellant perceived, and thus had actual knowledge of, the allegedly dangerous conditions about which she complained. Therefore, as a matter of law, neither the appellee contractor nor the appellee individual owed a duty to the appellant. Thus, the trial court did not err by granting the appellees’ no-evidence motions for summary judgment on the ground they did not owe a duty to the appellant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment.