ON STATE 'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE SECOND COURT OF APPEALS TARRANT COUNTY
The appellee was charged with an aggravated robbery. A grand jury indicted the appellee and, as an enhancement, alleged a prior conviction for felony theft. The state filed a "request" for the trial court to "enter findings of fact and conclusions of law signifying the rationale of its order of exclusion." The trial court did not rule on that request, and three days later, on January 25, the state filed an interlocutory notice of appeal pursuant to Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.01(a)(5). The appellate court noted that, shortly after filing its notice of appeal, the state filed an original mandamus proceeding in the appellate court "complaining about the trial court's refusal to enter a written order granting the motion." That writ application was denied in a summary opinion. The appellate court summarized the trial court's oral ruling as "what I have ruled is the defense continuance was denied and the evidence was inadmissible because of discovery violations." The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals noted the opinion of the appellate court did not address the issue whether the trial court, by refusing to enter a written order, could stymie the state's right to an interlocutory appeal; that discussion appeared only in the Chief Justice's concurrence, and thus, it was adressed. The court noted that the opinion of the appellate court did not address the issue of the necessity of a hearing; that discussion appeared only in the Justice's concurrence, and thus, it was adressed. Further, the court noted that the State v. Rosenbaum, 818 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) dealt with distinguishable facts. The trial judge quashed a portion of an indictment and signed a written order on June 28 that contained language that specified that the order was to be entered of record on July 2 and that it would become final in fifteen days, thus allowing the state to file an appeal on or before July 16. The state filed its appeal on July 16, but the appellate court calculated the time for appeal from June 28, when the trial judge signed the order, and dismissed the appeal as untimely. The instant court reversed, finding that, "under the peculiar facts" of the case, the state's filing was timely. That ruling was based on the existence of a written order, the absence of which was precisely the issue here. Further the court noted that pursuant to Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.01(a)(5), the state was entitled to appeal an order of a court in a criminal case if the order granted a motion to suppress, if jeopardy had not attached in the case, and if the prosecuting attorney certified to the trial court that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and that the evidence is of substantial importance in the case. The filing of a notice of appeal by a party invoked the jurisdiction of the appellate court over all parties to the trial court's judgment or order appealed from. As the Chief Justice noted in her concurring opinion, if a trial court refused to, or simply did not, enter a written order, the state's right to appeal a pretrial ruling could be stymied, but the statute stated that the state might appeal "an order," and the precedent required that an order be in writing. An order could not be signed unless it was written. In the instant case, there was no order from which to appeal, that was, no writing that memorialized the trial court's informal notations on the motion to suppress or the trial judge's oral explanation of her non-ruling. There was no written order from which to appeal, the appellate court correctly held that it has no jurisdiction over the state's appeal. Accordingly, the appellate court's judgment was affirmed.