ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE SECOND COURT OF APPEALS TARRANT COUNTY
A jury convicted the appellant of the murder of his wife. The trial judge denied the appellant's motion to suppress his statements to police during custodial questioning at a hospital after a magistrate had given him his Tex. Code Crim. Proc Article 15.17 rights. The trial judge rejected the appellant's claim that he had invoked both his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel when he asked the magistrate for an appointed attorney but also said that he wanted to talk to the police who were standing outside the hospital room. On remand from the instant court, the appellate court, over a dissent, held that the appellant had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to interrogation counsel during the magistration process. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State's petition for discretionary review to clarify the distinction after Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 129 S.Ct. 2079 (2009) between the Fifth Amendment right to interrogation counsel and the Sixth Amendment right to trial counsel. Under Montejo, the Fifth Amendment right to interrogation counsel was triggered by the Miranda warnings that police must give before beginning any custodial questioning. The Sixth Amendment right to trial counsel was triggered by judicial arraignment or Article 15.17 magistration. Both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel applied to post-magistration custodial interrogation, but each was invoked and waived in exactly the same manner-under the Fifth Amendment prophylactic Miranda rules. The court held that, because the appellant never invoked his right to interrogation counsel after the police gave him Miranda warnings, the trial judge did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress. Accordingly, the appellate court's judgment was reversed.