From the 224th Judicial District Court, Bexar County
The appellant was injured while working in the appellee company. The appellant sued the company for damages arising from those injuries. The trial court granted the company’s traditional and no evidence motions for summary judgment. The appellate court noted that Chapter 95 applied to the employee’s claims because Chapter 95 did not require the defective condition causing the injury be the “object” of the contractor’s work. The court further explained that because the ladder provided the appellant a means to reach his work site, Chapter 95 applied because the injury stemmed from a failure to provide a safe workplace. In the instant case, as in both Fisher v. Lee & Chang P’ship, 16 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) and Clark v. Ron Bassinger, No. 07-03-0291-CV, 2006 WL 229901 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 31, 2006, no pet.), the appellant was not injured by the improvement he was hired to repair. But, as in Fisher and Clark, the appellant was injured while accessing his work space. The appellant needed to use the scissor lift to access his work space, and although the nipple was not the object of the appellant’s work, it was an unsafe part of his workplace. Thus, the court held, as a matter of law, Chapter 95 applied to the appellant’s claims. Further, the court determined that the appellant failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence showing the company exerted contractual or actual control over his work. Because the appellant failed in his burden regarding the first prong of Chapter 95.003, the court need not address whether the company had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition. The court concluded that the trial court did not err by determining Chapter 95 applied, which was asserted in the company’s traditional motion for summary judgment, nor did the trial court err in granting the company’s no evidence motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was affirmed.