The instant case was an appeal following the entry of a judgment in favor of the appellant administrator of the decedent's estate and the appellant individuals in their medical malpractice cause of action against the appellee, following remand from the Texas Supreme Court. A petition for review was granted by the Texas Supreme Court to consider the interrelationship between two provisions of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of 1977, now repealed. Ultimately, the court determined both provisions could be given effect and reversed the judgment of the appellate court and remanded the cause to the trial court. The appellate court found the only thing that the trial court was authorized to do was to recalculate damages by applying the damages cap provided by section 11.02(a), and the provision of the 2009 judgment vacating the 2005 judgment exceeded the limited scope of the trial court's jurisdictional authority. Furthermore, it was patently cleared from the face of the judgment that the trial court changed the rate of post-judgment interest. Moreover, even though the 2009 judgment did not specify the date from which post-judgment interest should be calculated, it clearly did not provide for post-judgment interest on the corrected judgment from the date of the original 2005 judgment. Finally, the court found that the opinion of the Supreme Court made it clear that any claim of Texas appellate court in G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (1929) would be the subject of subsequent litigation. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that any suit against the appellee's insurer under former Article 4590i, section 11.02(c) was reserved for another case. Also, due to the limited jurisdiction of the trial court, the granting of additional relief would have exceeded the jurisdiction of the trial court. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying relief not expressly granted. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and remanded.