The Texas Supreme Court denied the motion for rehearing and withdrew the opinion of July 1, 2011 and substituted the instant opinion in its place. The respondent bought a home. Between 1991, when the respondent abandoned her house, and 2002, when the petitioner city demolished it, the respondent's home was a regular stop for code enforcement officials. Although utilities were disconnected and windows boarded up, the home suffered a break-in and was occasionally occupied by vagrants. The respondent did little to improve the property, apart from building a fence to impede access, and she consistently ignored notices from the petitioner. Inspectors returning to the home often found old notices left on the door. Later, the Dallas Urban Rehabilitation Standards Board (Board) reviewed prior complaints about the property and its general disrepair, found the respondent's house to be an urban nuisance, and ordered its demolition. In September 2002, the Board denied the respondent's request for rehearing and affirmed its order. Later, the petitioner's inspector found that the respondent had not repaired the property, and then the petitioner obtained a judicial demolition warrant. The petitioner thereafter demolished the house four days later. Before the demolition, the respondent challenged the Board’s decision to district court, but the appeal did not stay the demolition order. After the demolition, the respondent amended her complaint to include a due process claim and a claim for an unconstitutional taking. The trial court affirmed the Board’s finding that the respondent's home was an urban nuisance and awarded the petitioner $2,266.28 in attorneys fees. It then severed the respondent's constitutional claims and tried them to a jury. At the close of trial, the petitioner moved unsuccessfully for a directed verdict on the grounds that the Board’s nuisance determination was res judicata, precluding the respondent's takings claim. The jury rejected the petitioner's contention that the respondent's home was a public nuisance and awarded her $75,707.67 for the destruction of her house. The trial court denied the petitioner's post-verdict motions and signed a judgment in conformance with the verdict. The appellate court affirmed but held that the Board’s nuisance finding could not be preclusive because of the brief delay between the nuisance finding and the house’s demolition. The Texas Supreme Court noted that the Board's nuisance determination could not be accorded preclusive effect in a takings suit was compelled by the constitution and Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1980), by City of Houston v. Lurie, 224 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. 1949) and its antecedents, by the nature of the question and the nature of the right. The protection of property rights, central to the functioning of society, should not, indeed, could not, be charged to the same people who sought to take those rights away. As, the court believed that unelected municipal agencies could not be effective bulwarks against constitutional violations, it held that the Board's nuisance determination, and the trial court’s affirmance of that determination under a substantial evidence standard, were not entitled to preclusive effect in the respondent's takings case, and the trial court correctly considered the issue de novo. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.