On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas
The petitioners were firefighters for the respondent city. They sued the respondent, claiming that it improperly calculated pay for certain assignments in violation of the Firefighter and Police Civil Services Act. The petitioners sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as all pay and benefits lost as a result of the respondent's failure to properly pay the petitioner during temporary assignment of higher-classified duties. The petitioners also requested prejudgment interest on back pay, attorney’s fees, costs, and postjudgment interest. The respondent filed a jurisdictional plea asserting governmental immunity, which the trial court granted. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment as to the petitioners' back pay claims, holding that City of Houston v. Williams, 216 S.W.3d 827, and City of Sweetwater v. Waddell, 218 S.W.3d 80, “foreclose any award of money damages under the Civil Service Act unless the Legislature gave to the petitioners and the police officers, for whose benefit the act was passed, permission to sue.” The Texas Supreme Court found that the petitioners' claims for back pay and related damages for improper calculation of pay for assignments performed in the past were the type of retrospective relief that was held barred by governmental immunity in Heinrich and Williams. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment dismissing the petitioners' claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief, holding that such claims did not implicate governmental immunity. Although the appellate court correctly concluded that immunity did not preclude certain prospective claims, it was recently held by the Supreme Court that such actions must be brought against the relevant government officials, rather than the governmental entity itself. In Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373, it was observed that the suits could not be brought against the state, which retained immunity, but must be brought against the state actors in their official capacity. Here, the the petitioners' named the respondent rather than city officials in their official capacity as Heinrich required, but their pleading predated Heinrich. In addition to remanding to permit the petitioners to replead in light of chapter 271, the remand would also permit the petitioners to replead in light of Heinrich and seek appropriate relief, if any, against the relevant city officials. Accordingly, the petitioners' petition for review was granted and the appellate court's judgment was reversed.