The appellate court determined that the appellee had not cited any authority that would purport to give the court any authority to dismiss the appellants without a motion filed by them or on their behalf.
Lyle v. Midway Solar, LLC
Appellate: Civil, Damages, Procedure, Real Property, Technology, Torts
Texas 8th Court of Appeals
December 30, 2020
08-19-00216-CV
Jeff Alley
Published
The appellants appealed the judgment of the trial court, claiming that the solar panels and associated transmission lines impaired their ability to drill for any oil and gas which might lie beneath the surface. On appeal, the appellants sought damages from the appellees for that lost opportunity. The appellate court agreed with the appellee that the question of whether the accommodation doctrine applied was the starting point for the court's resolution of the appeal. The appellate court determined that given that there was no controversy over that aspect of the case at the time, the trial court should have dismissed the trespass and breach of contract claims without prejudice. The appellate court determined that the appellee had not cited any authority that would purport to give the court any authority to dismiss the appellants without a motion filed by them or on their behalf. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part the summary judgment, and remanded.

The appellate court agreed that by its plain text the scope of the statute prohibited or chilled a substantial amount of protected speech, rendering it unconstitutionally overbroad.
State v. Chen
Constitution, Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
December 31, 2020
14-19-00372-CR
Charles Spain
Published
The State appealed the judgment of the trial court which granted the defendant's application for writ of habeas corpus and motion to quash the information, arguing that the statute under which he was charged was facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to him under the First Amendment. On appeal, the State challenged the trial court's conclusion that the statute was facially unconstitutional and granted habeas-corpus relief and the motion to quash the information, thereby discharging the defendant. The appellate court found that the statute was content-neutral, and accordingly the court did not presume the invalidity of the statute and need not analyze it under strict scrutiny. The appellate court begin with the presumption that the statute was valid and that the Legislature had not acted unreasonably or arbitrarily. The appellate court agreed that by its plain text the scope of the statute prohibited or chilled a substantial amount of protected speech, rendering it unconstitutionally overbroad. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

The defendant had failed to carry his burden of proving the trial court’s recital in the judgment of conviction was contrary to the truth.
Smith v. State
Constitution, Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 5th Court of Appeals
December 31, 2020
05-19-01057-CR
Lana Myers
Published
The defendant appealed the judgment of the trial court which convicted him of possession of marijuana in an amount less than two ounces and unlawful carrying of a weapon. The appellate court found that the docket sheet in the clerk’s record documented two occasions when the defendant pled not guilty to the offense of unlawful carrying of a weapon. The appellate court noted that the trial court recorded in a docket entry that the case was called for trial, both sides announced ready, the defendant was admonished, waived formal arraignment, and pled not guilty. The appellate court concluded that the defendant had failed to carry his burden of proving the trial court’s recital in the judgment of conviction was contrary to the truth. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The appellate court concluded that a potential agreement that would be invalid under the terms of the trust could not supply a basis for making the appellant’s requested relief into a justiciable controversy.
Ackers v. Comerica Bank & Trust
Appellate: Civil, Contracts, Litigation: Personal Injury, Procedure, Wills/Trusts/Probate
Texas 11th Court of Appeals
December 31, 2020
11-18-00352-CV
John M. Bailey
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court which denied the appellant's request for declaratory judgment, seeking a determination that some of his descendants should be excluded at his death. The appellate court noted that the appellant asserted that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment on the basis of ripeness, and ripeness was a component of the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The appellate court found that the appellant’s claim involved making a determination of class membership of a gift made to a class and the appellant acknowledged that the gift to his descendants was a class gift and that his descendants were contingent, non-vested beneficiaries. The appellate court concluded that a potential agreement that would be invalid under the terms of the trust could not supply a basis for making the appellant’s requested relief into a justiciable controversy. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

The appellants have not established that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit the expert witnesses to testify regarding the subjective intent of the appellee or its employees.
Wellons v. Valero Ref.—New Orleans, L.L.C.
Appellate: Civil, Damages, Employment, Insurance, Litigation: Personal Injury, Torts, Workers' Compensation
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
December 31, 2020
14-18-01075-CV
Frances Bourliot
Published
The appellants appealed the judgment of the trial court which determined that Louisiana law should apply to the claims against the appellee and from the court’s final take-nothing judgment favoring the appellee. The appellate court found that because the appellants could still obtain Louisiana benefits and the appellee had greater immunity under Louisiana law than Texas law, Restatement Section 184 dictated that Louisiana law applies to the claims against the appellee. The appellate court noted that the trial court did not err in applying Louisiana law to those claims. The appellate court determined that the appellants have not established that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit the expert witnesses to testify regarding the subjective intent of the appellee or its employees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

The appellate court found that because no clear abuse of discretion had been demonstrated, the order granting a new trial was not subject to mandamus correction by the court.
In re Rudolph Auto., LLC
Constitution, Procedure, Torts
Texas 8th Court of Appeals
December 30, 2020
08-18-00149-CV
Gina M. Palafox
Published
The relators appealed the judgment of the trial court, filing a motion to disregard the jury’s answer to the question on comparative responsibility asserting that the jury’s assignment of 10% fault to the relators conflicted with its earlier no-liability finding on negligence. On appeal, the relators asked the Court to direct the judge of the trial court to vacate his order granting a new trial, harmonize the verdict consistent with the relators’ interpretation of the jury’s verdict, render judgment on the harmonized verdict, and award costs and other appropriate relief. The appellate court noted that there were several grounds, individually and collectively, that would support the trial court’s new trial order in its entirety. The appellate court found that because no clear abuse of discretion had been demonstrated, the order granting a new trial was not subject to mandamus correction by the court. Accordingly, the relators’ petition for a writ of mandamus was denied.

The lease contained a purchase option that gave the appellee, by unilateral exercise of its own will, the immediate right to compel the transfer of fee title.
Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Int'l Am. Educ. Fed'n Inc.
Contracts, Corporations, Education, Real Property, Tax
Texas 5th Court of Appeals
December 29, 2020
05-19-01354-CV
David Schenck
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court which granted summary judgment in favor of the appellee. On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial court erred by concluding the appellee was entitled to an exemption for certain property it leased. The appellate court found that the appellee argued, as the trial court declared, that it had equitable title to the property because a purchase option within the lease agreement gave it the unqualified, unilateral right to assume fee title to the property. The appellate court determined that the provision provided the lessee, the appellee, with the power to compel transfer of legal title. The appellate court concluded that the lease contained a purchase option that gave the appellee, by unilateral exercise of its own will, the immediate right to compel the transfer of fee title. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was affirmed.

The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not err by denying the appellant’s special appearance.
Petrosaudi Oil Services Ltd. v. Hartley
Appellate: Civil, Contracts, Corporations, International, Litigation: Personal Injury, Procedure, Torts
Texas 1st Court of Appeals
December 29, 2020
01-19-00607-CV
Evelyn V. Keyes
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court which ruled in favor of the appellee in a suit under the Jones Act for injuries he allegedly received while working on the drillship that was anchored off the coast of Trinidad and Tobago. On appeal, the appellant filed a special appearance, asserting that it was a non-resident of Texas and that Texas courts could not exercise personal jurisdiction over it consistent with due process guarantees. The appellate court found that the evidence supported the trial court’s implied finding that the appellant maintained an office in Houston and that it had sufficient minimum contacts with Texas to support the exercise of jurisdiction in the state. The appellate court noted that although it might be burdensome for the president, as the appellant’s president, to travel to Texas to participate in litigation, the same could be said of all non-residents and distance alone could not ordinarily defeat jurisdiction. The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not err by denying the appellant’s special appearance. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was affirmed.

The appellate court concluded that a trial court abused its discretion if its decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, and without reference to guiding principles.
Hydrochem LLC v. Evoqua Water Technologies, LLC
Appellate: Civil, Contracts, Employment, Procedure
Texas 1st Court of Appeals
December 31, 2020
01-19-00770-CV
Sarah Beth Landau
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court in a suit for claims for trade secret misappropriation, violation of 2 the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and breach of contract. On appeal, the appellant challenged the appellee's allegations that the appellant moved to the competitor entity in violation of various contract provisions and restrictive covenants and their alleged use of confidential trade secret information for the third appellant’s financial benefit. The appellant further contended that the trial court erred in denying their TCPA motion and in finding that their motion was frivolous or filed solely for purpose of delay. The appellate court found that to the extent that the court's resolution of the case required to the court to address issues of statutory construction, the court reviewed such issues de novo. The appellate court noted that because all four Castleman factors were met, the trial court did not err in denying the appellants’ motion to dismiss. The appellate court concluded that a trial court abused its discretion if its decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, and without reference to guiding principles. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

The appellate court concluded that it was confident that the trial court would comply, and the court's writ would issue only if it failed to do so.
In re Torres
Appellate: Civil, Constitution, Family, Procedure
Texas 10th Court of Appeals
December 30, 2020
10-20-00266-CV
Tom Gray
Published
The petitioners appealed the judgment of the trial court, filing a writ of mandamus after the trial court denied their Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Strike Petition in Intervention, and Motion to Dismiss. On appeal, the petitioners challenged the trial court's denial of the petitioners’ motion and granted the parents' leave to intervene in the proceeding. The appellate court found that they did not meet the twelve-month requirement of Section 102.003(a)(12) and outside of the 313 days the parents were the foster parents of the children, their response to the petition in the proceeding listed an additional 32 days in which they contended they had actual care, control, or possession of the children. The appellate court conditionally granted the petition for writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its Order Denying Intervenor Torres’ Plea to the Jurisdiction signed. The appellate court concluded that it was confident that the trial court would comply, and the court's writ would issue only if it failed to do so. Accordingly, the petition was granted.

The appellate court concluded that the law required the trial court to grant the appellant's motion to dismiss.
Aquatic Care Programs, Inc. v. Cooper
Appellate: Civil, Gov't/Administrative, Health Care
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
December 29, 2020
14-18-01108-CV
Kem Thompson Frost
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling objections to the appellee's expert reports and in denying the appellant's motions to dismiss based on alleged violations of the Texas Medical Liability Act’s expert-report requirements. The appellate court found that in the absence of a qualified expert with a report addressing the essential liability components of the appellee's health care liability claims, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sustain the appellant's objections. The appellate court noted that because the trial court already had granted the appellee one thirty-day extension to supplement her expert reports, the trial court had no discretion to overrule the objections. The appellate court concluded that the law required the trial court to grant the appellant's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to the trial court for rendition of a judgment of dismissal.

The trial court’s failure to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law did not leave the defendant to guess the basis for the trial court’s rulings and did not prevent him from making a proper presentation of his case to the court.
Isaac v. Burnside
Appellate: Civil, Procedure, Real Property, Wills/Trusts/Probate
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
December 29, 2020
14-18-01096-CV
Kem Thompson Frost
Published
The defendant appealed the judgment of the trial court which ruled in favor of the plaintiff in a suit alleging that the defendant breached his fiduciary duty as executor by failing to give the plaintiff one-half of the money in the decedent’s bank accounts and by failing to pay the plaintiff for expenses she incurred for the decedent’s funeral. The appellate court held that because a trial on the merits followed the denial of the defendant’s summary judgment motion, the court could not review the trial court’s denial of the motion. The appellate court found that under its unambiguous language, the decedent's will did not contain any written directions for the disposition of the decedent’s remains, and thus, Texas Health and Safety Code section 711.002(h) did not apply to the case. The appellate court concluded that the trial court’s failure to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law did not leave the defendant to guess the basis for the trial court’s rulings and did not prevent him from making a proper presentation of his case to the court. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

A rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably believe his use of force was immediately necessary to make or assist in making an arrest or search.
Warren v. State
Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
December 31, 2020
14-19-00589-CR
Kem Thompson Frost
Published
The defendant appealed the judgment of the trial court which convicted the defendant, a Metro Police Department patrol officer, of misdemeanor assault for striking a man at a transit center platform with a baton. On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court's conviction. The appellate court found that the jury reasonably could have inferred from the evidence that the defendant's use of the baton, a tool the defendant was taught to use to achieve pain, did that very thing. The appellate court concluded that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably believe his use of force, particularly the baton-strikes against the victim's chest once the victim already was on the ground, was immediately necessary to make or assist in making an arrest or search. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

The trial court erred when it granted the appellee’s motion to dismiss for the State’s pre-litigation non-compliance with statutory requirements.
State v. Mesquite Creek Dev., Inc.
Appellate: Civil, Contracts, Corporations, Damages, Gov't/Administrative, Real Property, Torts, Transportation
Texas 5th Court of Appeals
December 31, 2020
05-19-00028-CV
David Evans
Published
The State appealed the judgment of the trial court which dismissed the State’s condemnation suit against the appellees. On appeal, the State challenged the trial court's award to the appellees. The appellate court agreed with the State that when the appellees withdrew the award it waived any complaint about whether pre-litigation procedures were followed and waived all other issues except its complaint about the adequacy of the award. The appellate court thoroughly laid out the statutory condemnation procedure and labeled it as a separate phase of the condemnation process in recognition of the appellee’s argument that a significant purpose of the procedures was to protect property owners from governmental abuse. The appellate court concluded that having reviewed sufficient grounds raised by the State and the appellee’s counterarguments, the trial court erred when it granted the appellee’s motion to dismiss for the State’s pre-litigation non-compliance with statutory requirements. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and remanded.

The trial court’s decision that any prejudice flowing from the statement was curable was within the zone of reasonable disagreement, and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for mistrial.
Rankin v. State
Constitution, Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 1st Court of Appeals
December 29, 2020
01-19-00156-CR
Sarah Beth Landau
Published
The defendant appealed the judgment of the trial court which convicted the defendant of murder. On appeal, the defendant challenged the jury's assessment of punishment at 15 years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The appellate court found that like the defendant in Estrada v. State, the defendant could have left the hospital or asked the police for a ride home, but she did not. The appellate court noted that there was no manifestation of probable cause that would have led the defendant to believe that she was under arrest, and the trial court’s decision to deny her motion to suppress was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. The appellate court concluded that the trial court’s decision that any prejudice flowing from the statement was curable was within the zone of reasonable disagreement, and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for mistrial. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

The appellate court concluded that the plaintiff had not shown that the trial court erred in granting the defendants' amended no-evidence summary-judgment motion.
Brown v. Tarbert, LLC
Contracts, Corporations, Procedure, Real Property
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
December 29, 2020
14-18-00388-CV
Charles Spain
Published
The plaintiff appealed the judgment of the trial court, alleging that the house contained toxic mold and required repairs, further asserting claims of violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices–Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the trial court’s rendition of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The appellate court found that none of the evidence presented by the plaintiff in response to the defendants' amended summary-judgment motion was competent, as none of it was properly authenticated. The appellate court need not address additional arguments concerning whether the plaintiff's exhibits were properly stricken. The appellate court concluded that the plaintiff had not shown that the trial court erred in granting the defendants' amended no-evidence summary-judgment motion. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was affirmed.

The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred by denying the defendant's TCPA motion to dismiss.
Choctaw Constr. Services, LLC v. Rail-Life R.R. Services, LLC
Appellate: Civil, Business, Contracts, Employment, Gov't/Administrative, Procedure, Torts
Texas 1st Court of Appeals
December 29, 2020
01-20-00216-CV
Sarah Beth Landau
Published
The defendant appealed the judgment of the trial court which denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the suit for tortious interference with contract, business disparagement, and other claims arising out of allegedly false allegations by the defendant. On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the suit under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). The appellate court noted that because the court held that at least one of the defendant's constitutional rights invoked the TCPA, the court now determined whether the plaintiff established by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each element of its claims for tortious interference with a contract and business disparagement. The appellate court found that the plaintiff had not met its prima facie burden for its business-disparagement claim because the evidence showed that the defendant's statement was, in fact, true, negating the “false and disparaging information” element. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred by denying the defendant's TCPA motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and remanded.

The defendant's claim that he must surrender a protected right under the statute was irrelevant because the statute violated neither the First nor the Second Amendment.
Ex Parte Lee
Constitution, Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 1st Court of Appeals
December 29, 2020
01-18-00969-CR
Gordon Goodman
Published
The defendant appealed the judgment of the trial court which convicted him of unlawfully carrying a firearm in his vehicle while a member of a criminal street gang, in violation of section 46.02(a-1)(2)(C) of the Texas Penal Code. On appeal, the defendant filed a pre-trial application for writ of habeas corpus challenging the statute as void under the First and Second Amendments to the United States Constitution. The appellate court noted that because section 46.02(a-1)(2)(C) did not restrict the core purpose of the Second Amendment, the court applied intermediate scrutiny in evaluating the defendant's Second Amendment challenge to the statute. The appellate court found that the statute satisfied intermediate scrutiny because the statute was reasonably adapted to promote a significant governmental interest. The appellate court concluded that the defendant's claim that he must surrender a protected right under the statute was irrelevant because the statute violated neither the First nor the Second Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

The trial court did not err by ruling that it no longer retained exclusive continuing jurisdiction over the possession, access, and conservatorship aspects of the parent-child relationship between the appellant and the children.
Cortez v. Cortez
Appellate: Civil, Family, Juvenile, Procedure
Texas 1st Court of Appeals
December 29, 2020
01-19-00296-CV
Evelyn V. Keyes
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court which rendered a divorce decree requiring that the primary residence of their minor children was to be in Texas. The appellate court found that the trial court signed several orders declining jurisdiction over the case, and at the appellant’s request, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellate court noted that the trial court found that the appellee and the children had moved to Mexico where they had lived continuously ever since, and the record before the trial court included an affidavit by the appellee that she filed with her counter-petition to modify the agreed divorce decree. The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not err by determining that neither the children, nor the children and one parent, had a significant connection with Texas and that substantial evidence was no longer available in Texas concerning the children’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships. The appellate court determined that the trial court did not err by ruling that it no longer retained exclusive continuing jurisdiction over the possession, access, and conservatorship aspects of the parent-child relationship between the appellant and the children. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was affirmed.

Since the appellant’s requested modification to include prejudgment interest and costs would have awarded additional relief that was considered and rejected by the arbitrator, the trial court did not err in refusing the requested modification and confirming the arbitration award.
Ortiz v. Builders First Source - S. Tex., LP
ADR, Appellate: Civil, Damages, Employment, Insurance, Litigation: Personal Injury, Procedure, Torts, Workers' Compensation
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
December 29, 2020
14-19-00394-CV
Tracy Christopher
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court which vacated the arbitrator’s sanctions order based on evident partiality. The appellate court observed that it were aware of no FAA provision or state statute authorizing a trial court to modify an arbitration award to include prejudgment interest and costs, nor had the appellant identified any such authority. The appellate court found that he instead relied on caselaw addressing an arbitrator’s authority to modify an award, as opposed to a trial court’s authority to do so, or a trial court’s modification of an arbitration award under the Texas General Arbitration Act to correct the arbitrator’s error in calculating an award of prejudgment interest after the arbitrator expressed an intent to award it. The appellate court determined that the arbitration award accurately reflected the arbitrator’s intent, without material miscalculation of figures. The appellate court concluded that because the appellant’s requested modification to include prejudgment interest and costs would have awarded additional relief that was considered and rejected by the arbitrator, the trial court did not err in refusing the requested modification and confirming the arbitration award. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

The record contained sufficient evidence to raise a fact issue as to whether the foreman and/or general superintendent were decision-makers and had knowledge of the appellant’s on-the-job injury at the time the appellant was placed on the reduction of force list and terminated.
Salas v. Fluor Daniel Services Corp.
Damages, Employment, Torts, Workers' Compensation
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
December 29, 2020
14-18-01103-CV
Meagan Hassan
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court which granted a no-evidence and traditional summary judgment in favor of the appellee. On appeal, the appellant contended that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment on his workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge claim under Texas Labor Code section 451.001(1) and (3). The appellate court noted that contrary to the appellant’s assertion, there was no evidence that he engaged in protected activity under section 451.001(1). The appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence that the appellant instituted or caused to be instituted a proceeding under the Workers’ Compensation Act when he informed his supervisor of his injury and thus engaged in protected conduct under section 451.001(3). The appellate court determined that the record contained sufficient evidence to raise a fact issue as to whether the foreman and/or general superintendent were decision-makers and had knowledge of the appellant’s on-the-job injury at the time the appellant was placed on the reduction of force list and terminated. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment on that basis. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed, reversed, and remanded.

The appellate court concluded that the issue of breach of the Settlement Agreement must be retried, and specific performance was an equitable remedy for breach of contract.
Maxey v. Maxey
Appellate: Civil, Contracts, Procedure, Real Property
Texas 1st Court of Appeals
December 29, 2020
01-19-00078-CV
Evelyn V. Keyes
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court which found that the appellant breached the settlement and rejected the appellant’s counterclaims. On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial court's entry of the judgment on the jury verdict, awarding specific performance of release language in the settlement agreement and assessing attorney’s fees against the appellant. The appellate court noted that because the language of the Settlement Agreement was unambiguous, the trial court and not the jury should have determined the parties’ intent as a matter of law, and it could not do so by relying on extrinsic evidence to create an intent that the contract itself did not express. The appellate court held that the trial court reversibly erred by ruling that the Settlement Agreement was ambiguous, admitting and instructing the jury to consider parol evidence concerning whether the parties intended to divide the property according to the Survey, and submitting the question to the jury. The appellate court concluded that the issue of breach of the Settlement Agreement must be retried, and specific performance was an equitable remedy for breach of contract. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case.

When properly construed and analyzed as a whole, sections 483.042(a) and 483.001(2) provided both fair notice of the prohibited conduct and sufficient guidelines for law enforcement, prosecutors, juries, and judges.
Ex parte Jarreau
Constitution, Criminal, Evidence, Health Care, Procedure
Texas 4th Court of Appeals
December 23, 2020
04-19-00704-CR
Irene Rios
Published
The defendant appealed the judgment of the trial court which convicted the defendant of delivery of a dangerous drug. On appeal, the defendant filed a pretrial application for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the relevant penal statutes, sections 483.042(a) and 483.001(2) of the Texas Health and Safety Code, were unconstitutionally vague on their face. The appellate court found that when measured by common understanding and practices, sections 483.042(a) and 483.001(2) provide ordinary people fair notice of the criminalized conduct. The appellate court noted that it could not be said that the challenged statutes provided “no standard” for law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, and juries, or that they delegated policy matters. The appellate court concluded that when properly construed and analyzed as a whole, sections 483.042(a) and 483.001(2) provided both fair notice of the prohibited conduct and sufficient guidelines for law enforcement, prosecutors, juries, and judges. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed and remanded for further proceedings.

The appellate court had no need to reach the question of whether the claimed false information in the plaintiff's application would independently support dismissal of the claim under a “resume fraud” theory.
Tex. Dep't of Aging & Disability Services v. Lagunas
Civil Rights, Employment, Evidence, Gov't/Administrative, Health Care
Texas 8th Court of Appeals
December 23, 2020
08-19-00095-CV
Jeff Alley
Published
The defendant appealed the judgment of the trial court which denied its Plea to the Jurisdiction in a suit under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court should have granted its Plea to the Jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant hired a younger individual to fill the position for which he applied. The appellate court found that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant's decision to restructure the department was made with discriminatory intent. The appellate court had no need to reach the question of whether the claimed false information in the plaintiff's application would independently support dismissal of the claim under a “resume fraud” theory, or whether the plaintiff met the objective criteria set forth in the job posting for the "Assistant Unit Director" or "AUD" position. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claims for lack of jurisdiction.

The fact the Department failed to meet its burden of proof and the child remained in managing conservatorship was not alone sufficient reason to exercise the court's discretion to remand for a new trial in the interest of justice.
In re J.M.T.
Appellate: Civil, Gov't/Administrative, Juvenile, Procedure
Texas 4th Court of Appeals
December 23, 2020
04-19-00807-CV
Luz Elena D Chapa
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court which terminated the parent-child relationship between the appellant and the child, finding that it was in the child’s best interest. The appellate court found that in the usual case when the evidence was found to be legally insufficient to support a trial court’s termination order, the court had a duty to render judgment denying the petition to terminate. The appellate court determined that when unique or unusual circumstances resulted in the case not being fully developed, the court may exercise its discretion to remand for a new trial in the interest of justice. The appellate court concluded that the fact the Department failed to meet its burden of proof and the child remained in managing conservatorship was not alone sufficient reason to exercise the court's discretion to remand for a new trial in the interest of justice. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and rendered.

The appellate court concluded that regarding the awards for past and future mental anguish, loss of use, and diminution of value, the court had authority, pursuant to Rule 43.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, to reform the judgment removing the improper jury awards.
Wolf v. Starr
Appellate: Civil, Contracts, Damages, Evidence, Procedure, Torts
Texas 8th Court of Appeals
December 23, 2020
08-14-00236-CV
Yvonne T. Rodriguez
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court which ruled in favor of the appellees for actual damages, mental anguish, attorney fees, and exemplary damages. On appeal, the appellant claimed that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support multiple parts of the jury award. The appellate court noted that it must determine whether the record contained evidence of how the diminished value contained in the repair estimate was calculated, and whether it was proper to include it in the award of damages. The appellate court sustained the appellant’s fourth issue only as it pertained to the diminished value portion of the damages estimate. The appellate court concluded that regarding the awards for past and future mental anguish, loss of use, and diminution of value, the court had authority, pursuant to Rule 43.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, to reform the judgment removing the improper jury awards. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed as modified and reversed in part.
