The appellate court concluded that because the trial court’s judgment may be upheld on the appellant's joint liability with the appellant firm, the court need not consider his alternative argument regarding an alter-ego theory or a piercing of the corporate veil.
Nevarez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank
Appellate: Civil, Banking and Finance, Procedure
Texas 8th Court of Appeals
March 05, 2021
08-19-00120-CV
Gina M. Palafox
Published
The appellants appealed the judgment of the trial court, filing an answer generally denying the allegations and asserting various affirmative defenses, which were not at issue there. On appeal, the appellants appealed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the appellee. The appellate court found that the appellee proved there was no genuine issue of material fact on its claim for money had and received against the appellant firm and that the appellants’ asserted defenses did not apply there. The appellate court determined that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment against the appellant firm on the appellee's claim for money had and received. The appellate court concluded that because the trial court’s judgment may be upheld on the appellant's joint liability with the appellant firm, the court need not consider his alternative argument regarding an alter-ego theory or a piercing of the corporate veil. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment.
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(c), without hearing oral argument, the court conditionally granted the petitioner mandamus relief and directed the trial court to vacate its order granting the respondent’s motion to designate an individual as an unknown responsible third party.
In re Gonzales
Appellate: Civil, Procedure, Torts
The Supreme Court of Texas
March 05, 2021
20-0506
Per Curiam
Published
The petitioner appealed the judgment of the trial court, alleging that the respondent negligently caused an automobile accident. On appeal, the petitioner challenged a trial court's order allowing the respondent to designate an unknown person as a responsible third party. The Supreme Court found that because the trial court failed to properly apply section 33.004, it abused its discretion by granting the respondent’s motion for leave to designate an individual as an unknown responsible third party. The Supreme Court determined that the petitioner did not have an adequate remedy at law and rendered mandamus relief appropriate. The Supreme Court concluded that pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(c), without hearing oral argument, the court conditionally granted the petitioner mandamus relief and directed the trial court to vacate its order granting the respondent’s motion to designate an individual as an unknown responsible third party. Accordingly, the court's writ would issue only if the trial court failed to comply.
The appellate court concluded that the appellees were not entitled to attorney’s fees and sustained that issue.
Paxton v. Waller Cnty.
Appellate: Civil, Gov't/Administrative
Texas 7th Court of Appeals
March 04, 2021
07-20-00297-CV
Judy C. Parker
Published
The Attorney General appealed the judgment of the trial court in an action for mandamus and civil penalties against the appellees. On appeal, the Attorney General claimed that the County was unlawfully attempting to prohibit licensed handgun owners carrying handguns from accessing the county courthouse building in its entirety, in violation of Texas Government Code Section 411.209. The appellate court found that because the appellees were seeking a declaration of their rights under the statutes, not challenging their validity, the appellant's immunity was not waived under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA). The appellate court could not conclude that the appellant acted outside of his authority in making that determination, and therefore, the appellees failed to allege a viable ultra vires claim against the appellant. The appellate court concluded that the appellees were not entitled to attorney’s fees and sustained that issue. Accordingly, the court reversed the order of the trial court.
The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for cargo theft under section 31.18(b)(1) of the Texas Penal Code.
Joe v. State
Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 10th Court of Appeals
March 03, 2021
10-18-00221-CR
John E. Neill
Published
The defendant appealed the judgment of the trial court, contending that the evidence supported his conviction for theft of cargo was insufficient. The appellate court found that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, a rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in conduct namely, hooking up the trailer to his truck that demonstrated possession of the goods. The appellate court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for cargo theft under section 31.18(b)(1) of the Texas Penal Code. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction in the case for felony assault family violence.
Busby v. State
Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 10th Court of Appeals
March 03, 2021
10-18-00262-CR
John E. Neill
Published
The defendant appealed the judgment of the trial court which convicted him of assault family violence under section 22.01(a)(1), which was enhanced by his prior conviction for assault family violence under section 22.01(b)(2)(A). On appeal, the defendant challenged his conviction for felony assault family violence. The appellate court observed that the State presented certified copies of the complaint, information, and waiver of rights in the case. The appellate court found that it was sufficient evidence to prove the element of a prior conviction involving assault family violence to enhance the charged offense in this case to a third-degree felony, and the defendant's guilty plea constituted some evidence to support his conviction for misdemeanor assault family violence. The appellate court concluded that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction in the case for felony assault family violence. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.
The Supreme Court concluded that only a subset of those who engage in the covered behavior—not just anyone—could be penalized under the ordinance.
In re Durnin
Constitution, Election, Gov't/Administrative
The Supreme Court of Texas
March 02, 2021
21-0170
James D Blacklock
Published
The relators appealed the judgment of the trial court, supporting the City's ordinance and filing the mandamus proceeding seeking changes to the Council’s ballot language. On appeal, the relators supported the citizen-initiated ordinance regarding camping in public spaces, sitting and lying down on public sidewalks, and the aggressive solicitation of money. The Supreme Court found that the relators have clearly established their entitlement to mandamus relief in one respect and the Council’s ballot language said the proposed ordinance created a criminal offense and a penalty for anyone sitting or lying down on a public sidewalk or sleeping outdoors in or near downtown and for anyone camping in a public area not designated by the Parks and Recreation Department. The Supreme Court determined that the ordinance itself, however, did not apply to anyone who engaged in the listed activities, and to the contrary, the ordinance contained several exceptions covering a variety of common uses of the sidewalk that the ordinance did not criminalize. The Supreme Court concluded that only a subset of those who engage in the covered behavior—not just anyone—could be penalized under the ordinance. Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus was conditionally granted in part.
The appellate court concluded that it was without jurisdiction to consider the issues raised by the State.
State v. Garcia
Constitution, Criminal, Evidence, Immigration, Procedure
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
March 02, 2021
14-20-00548-CR
Jerry Zimmerer
Published
The State appealed the judgment of the trial court which granted the defendant's application for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Article 11.09 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in which he alleged that his guilty plea was involuntary because he was not advised of the immigration consequences of his plea. The appellate court found that unlike the trial court in Garcia, the trial court did not make specific findings of fact, nor did the trial court’s order granted a new trial. The appellate court determined that the trial court vacated the conviction and discharged the defendant, and the record did not reflect that the trial court ordered a rehearing in the case. The appellate court further found that because the trial court’s grant of relief to an applicant for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.09 could not be fairly characterized as an unfavorable ruling on a ruling from which the State would otherwise have the right to appeal the order, Article 44.01 did not authorize the State’s appeal in the cause. The appellate court concluded that it was without jurisdiction to consider the issues raised by the State. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
To the extent that the appellant challenged the appellee’s second summary-judgment ground that the appellee could not be sued as a non sui juris entity, the court did not reach that argument as the trial court’s judgment was supportable on the statute-of-limitations ground.
Sorrow v. Harris Cnty. Sheriff
Appellate: Civil, Constitution, Evidence, Gov't/Administrative, Health Care, Litigation: Personal Injury, Procedure, Torts
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
March 02, 2021
14-18-00901-CV
Charles Spain
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court, alleging a variety of tort, statutory, and constitutional violations stemming from the appellant’s medical treatment while in the custody of the Sheriff during his pre-trial detention. On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial court’s grant of the appellee’s second amended motion for summary judgment, which dismissed with prejudice the appellant’s claims that he suffered injuries from medical care he received in pre-trial detention while in the appellee’s custody. The appellate court noted that the appellant had not demonstrated that his injuries were categorically undiscoverable, and the trial court did not err in refusing to apply the discovery rule to toll limitations. The appellate court found that to the extent that the appellant challenged the appellee’s second summary-judgment ground that the appellee could not be sued as a non sui juris entity, the court did not reach that argument as the trial court’s judgment was supportable on the statute-of-limitations ground. The appellate court concluded that the record had been supplemented to the extent of documents in the possession of the district clerk. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The appellate court concluded that the State agreed with the defendant, the defendant was incompetent at the time of his trial and his trial was rendered invalid on due-process grounds.
Bautista v. State
Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
March 02, 2021
14-18-00042-CR
Jerry Zimmerer
Published
The defendant appealed the judgment of the trial court which convicted him of aggravated sexual assault of a child. The appellate court noted that none of the defendant's arguments established that, when viewed under the appropriate standard of review, the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction. The appellate court disagreed that the jury’s decision to not convict the defendant of the greater charge factors into the court's analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the lesser included offense conviction. The appellate court determined that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence provided by the complainant was legally sufficient to support the defendant's conviction. The appellate court concluded that the State agreed with the defendant, the defendant was incompetent at the time of his trial and his trial was rendered invalid on due-process grounds. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case.
Even if the substance of the plea to the jurisdiction were a motion for summary judgment on the merits, the trial court would have erred in granting summary judgment based on any of the grounds expressly presented in the motion.
Roy v. Alkusari, L.L.C.
Civil Rights, Employment
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
March 02, 2021
14-19-00121-CV
Randy Wilson
Published
The appellant, a former employee, challenged the trial court’s granting of the appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction in the sex-discrimination case. The appellate court observed that a non-governmental defendant’s failure to have enough employees to qualify as an employer under Texas Labor Code section 21.002(8)(A) did not deprive a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over claims against the defendant under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code (the Act). The appellate court found that even if the substance of the plea to the jurisdiction were a motion for summary judgment on the merits, the trial court would have erred in granting summary judgment based on any of the grounds expressly presented in the motion. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and remanded.
The appellate court concluded that the appellant failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence the appellee’s suit was based on, related to, or in response to its exercise of free speech or free association.
Teachers Fed. Credit Union v. Esquivel
Civil Rights, Constitution, Torts
Texas 8th Court of Appeals
February 26, 2021
08-18-00200-CV
Yvonne T. Rodriguez
Published
The appellant appealed the trial court’s denial of its Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act (the Act). On appeal, the appellant filed a motion to dismiss under the Act, asserting the appellee’s claims were based on or related to the appellant’s exercise of free speech and free association as defined under the Act. The appellate court held that the appellant did not meet its burden in proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the appellee’s lawsuit was based on, related to, or in response to its exercise of the right of free speech or its right of association. The appellate court found that the appellant’s motion was properly denied. The appellate court concluded that the appellant failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence the appellee’s suit was based on, related to, or in response to its exercise of free speech or free association. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of the appellant’s Motion to Dismiss.
There was sufficient evidence for a jury to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant recklessly caused the child serious bodily injury by failing to seek medical treatment.
Cyr v. State
Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 11th Court of Appeals
February 26, 2021
11-19-00041-CR
W. Bruce Williams
Published
The defendant appealed the judgment of the trial court which convicted the defendant of recklessly, by omission, causing serious bodily injury or serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury to a child fourteen years of age or younger. On appeal, the defendant challenged the punishment at confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a term of fifteen years. The appellate court found that because the trial court erred in omitting an instruction on concurrent causation and because the error caused at least some harm to the defendant, the court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial consistent with the opinion. The appellate court determined that viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant recklessly caused the child serious bodily injury by failing to seek medical treatment. The appellate court declined to further address the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence that the defendant caused the child serious bodily injury by failing to protect the child. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for a new trial consistent with the opinion.
The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not err in granting the appellee’s motion to dismiss based on the existence of the forum-selection clause.
Sullivan v. Microsoft Corp.
Contracts, Employment
Texas 8th Court of Appeals
February 26, 2021
08-20-00046-CV
Jeff Alley
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court which granted the appellee's motion to dismiss the appellant’s lawsuit based on a forum-selection clause that was contained in an employment agreement signed by both parties. On appeal, the appellant contended that his lawsuit was not based on a breach of that employment agreement, but rather the breach of an offer letter that set forth his compensation schedule, and which did not contain a forum-selection clause. The appellant further alleged that the forum-selection clause did not apply to his breach of contract case, and that the trial court erred in dismissing his lawsuit on that basis. The appellate court noted that the two agreements were not intended to function separately, but were instead intended to function in tandem with each other to accomplish the same purpose, that was, to set forth the terms of the appellant’s employment, to include the nature of his compensation. The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not err in granting the appellee’s motion to dismiss based on the existence of the forum-selection clause. Accordingly, the trial court’s order was affirmed.
The trial court did not violate the appellant's due process right to be heard, including his right to present evidence and to a trial on the merits of his case.
Joseph v. Jack
Appellate: Civil, Constitution, Gov't/Administrative, Procedure
Texas 1st Court of Appeals
February 25, 2021
01-19-00280-CV
April L. Farris
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court, filing a bill of review requesting that the trial court vacate the default protective order, reopen those proceedings, and grant a new trial. On appeal, the appellant challenged the denial of both the appellant's bill of review and summary judgment motion. The appellate court found that Travieso did not support the appellant's argument that the serving officer was required to sign the return in his official capacity. The appellate court determined that the serving officer was not required to sign his name in his official capacity and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's bill of review. The appellate court disagreed with the appellant that the trial court erred by entering judgment on his bill of review when the appellee did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment. The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not violate the appellant's due process right to be heard, including his right to present evidence and to a trial on the merits of his case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed any pending motions as moot.
The appellate court disagreed with the appellant because his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not properly before the court when the appellee filed its motion or when the court ruled.
Chehab v. Edgewood Dev., Ltd.
Appellate: Civil, Contracts, Damages, Employment, Landlord and Tenant, Litigation: Personal Injury, Procedure, Real Property, Torts
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
February 25, 2021
14-20-00031-CV
Kevin Jewell
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court, alleging that the lockout notice was libelous per se. On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial court's grant of the appellee’s motion, dismissing with prejudice all of the appellant’s claims. The appellate court observed that the appellant’s live pleading at the time of the summary judgment hearing was the appellant’s first amended petition, which asserted claims for defamation and negligence, but not intentional infliction of emotional distress. The appellate court found that as a result, the summary judgment order disposed of all pending claims and parties when it was signed and the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on the appellant’s defamation claim. The appellate court affirmed the judgment dismissing the negligence claim. The appellate court disagreed with the appellant because his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not properly before the court when the appellee filed its motion or when the court ruled. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.
The evidence did not satisfy the appellees' burden of proof, and because the appellees did not conclusively negate the unsound-mind exception to limitations, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.
Rollins v. Pressler
Appellate: Civil, Criminal, Litigation: Personal Injury, Procedure, Torts
Texas 1st Court of Appeals
February 25, 2021
01-19-00460-CV
Gordon Goodman
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court, alleging that the appellee began molesting him after they met at a Bible study group led by the appellee. On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the appellee and the other appellees based on their limitations defense, which disposed of all but a handful of the appellant’s claims. The appellate court found that the prior litigation between the appellant and the appellee did not conclusively prove that the appellant was of sound mind when his sexual-assault claim last accrued. The appellate court noted that the evidence did not satisfy the appellees' burden of proof, and because the appellees did not conclusively negate the unsound-mind exception to limitations, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. The appellate court need not resolve the parties’ dispute about whether the doctrine of fraudulent concealment provided a defense to limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
The appellate court concluded that because Section 34.02(a)(4) was susceptible of a construction that provided an actus reus for the phrase “intends to finance or invest,” it was not unconstitutional for punishing mere thoughts and, therefore, it was not facially unconstitutional.
Ex parte Couch
Constitution, Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 2nd Court of Appeals
February 25, 2021
02-19-00216-CR
Wade J. Birdwell
Published
The defendant appealed the judgment of the trial court which convicted him of money laundering. On appeal, the defendant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus and an amended application for writ of habeas corpus, seeking dismissal of all four indictments. The appellate court noted that the Legislature enacted Penal Code Section Section 34.02(a)(4) with knowledge of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ construction of the phrase “finances or invests” in the illegal investment statute, and thus, the Legislature included the phrase “intends to finance or invest” to foreclose the similar argument made regarding the illegal investment statute. The appellate court found that the construction aligned with the legislative intent and the statute’s context defined an actus reus, and avoided violating the Constitution. The appellate court concluded that because Section 34.02(a)(4) was susceptible of a construction that provided an actus reus for the phrase “intends to finance or invest,” it was not unconstitutional for punishing mere thoughts and, therefore, it was not facially unconstitutional. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
The appellate court concluded that because the appellee did not conclusively negate the appellant’s unsound mind-tolling theory, it was not entitled to summary judgment based on limitations.
Rollins v. S. Baptist Convention
Appellate: Civil, Procedure, Torts
Texas 1st Court of Appeals
February 25, 2021
01-19-00149-CV
Gordon Goodman
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court, alleging that he was sexually abused by a member of the appellee’s executive committee. On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the appellee on the basis that the appellant’s claims against it were barred by limitations. The appellate court noted that the trial court ruled for the appellee on a single ground: limitations; and it was undisputed that the appellant raised the unsound mind-tolling exception in the trial court. The appellate court found that the appellant had preserved the issue for appellate review and the appellee bore the burden to prove that the appellant was of sound mind to obtain summary judgment. The appellate court determined that because the appellee did not conclusively negate the unsound-mind exception to limitations, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. The appellate court concluded that because the appellee did not conclusively negate the appellant’s unsound mind-tolling theory, it was not entitled to summary judgment based on limitations. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and remanded.
The appellate court concluded that in light of the evidence illustrative of the defendant's violent character, the admission of two witnesses’ opinion testimony was harmless.
Seidule v. State
Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
February 25, 2021
14-20-00010-CR
Kevin Jewell
Published
The defendant appealed the judgment of the trial court, challenging his murder conviction. The appellate court found that the trial court’s exclusion of the two witnesses’ evidence of the victim’s prior violent acts did not substantially injure the defendant's rights, and the error, if any, was harmless. The appellate court noted that the other evidence showed the defendant's violent character, which rendered the complained-of admitted evidence generally cumulative. The appellate court determined that the defendant admitted that he initially shot the victim while the victim stood, unarmed, at the kitchen sink. The appellate court concluded that in light of the evidence illustrative of the defendant's violent character, the admission of two witnesses’ opinion testimony was harmless. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.
The appellate court concluded that each side presented a significant amount of evidence on which the county intended to be her residence because the evidence was conflicted, and thus, the court could not substitute the court's judgment for the trial court’s.
Southcross Energy Partners GP, LLC v. Gonzalez
Appellate: Civil, Litigation: Personal Injury, Procedure, Real Property, Torts
Texas 4th Court of Appeals
February 24, 2021
04-18-00515-CV
Luz Elena D Chapa
Published
The appellant challenged the money judgment the trial court rendered in the appellees’ favor after a jury trial, seeking reversal and rendition of a take-nothing judgment. In response, the appellee cross-appealed the judgment, seeking reversal and a remand for a new trial. The appellate court found that applying the court's heightened standard of review, accounting for the undisputed facts in the case, and having thoroughly considered all of the evidence arguably relevant to the gross negligence finding, the court could not say the conscious indifference element of the jury’s gross negligence finding regarding the officer was supported by legally sufficient evidence. The appellate court was compelled to reverse the award of punitive damages, and although the cross appellants relied on the juror's testimony, the testimony of her mother and stepfather, and documentary evidence, there was conflicting evidence in the record. The appellate court concluded that each side presented a significant amount of evidence on which the county intended to be her residence because the evidence was conflicted, and thus, the court could not substitute the court's judgment for the trial court’s. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part, reversed, and rendered in part.
The appellate court concluded that because the Declaratory Judgments Act neither created jurisdiction nor permitted the rendition of advisory opinions, the trial court properly dismissed the appellant's claim for declaratory relief.
Tex. Med. Res., LLP v. Molina Healthcare of Tex., Inc.
ADR, Constitution, Health Care, Insurance
Texas 5th Court of Appeals
February 23, 2021
05-19-01447-CV
David Schenck
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court, claiming to have provided emergency medical care to more than 3,800 patients enrolled in the appellee's Health Insurance Exchange (HIX) plans. On appeal, the appellant sought judicial resolution of their claim that the appellee's reimbursement regime under Medicare–Medicaid programs, as implemented through the federal Affordable Care Act and corresponding federal and state regulations, was inadequate. The appellee filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting the appellants lacked standing to assert claims under the emergency care statute, the unfair settlement practices statute and the prompt payment statute. The appellate court found that the trial court did not err in dismissing the appellant's Section 1271.155 of the Texas Insurance Code claim. The appellate court noted that the appellant could not seek penalties under the prompt payment statute and thus the trial court did not err in dismissing the appellant's claim against the appellee for violation of the prompt payment statute. The appellate court concluded that because the Declaratory Judgments Act neither created jurisdiction nor permitted the rendition of advisory opinions, the trial court properly dismissed the appellant's claim for declaratory relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s order granting the appellee's Plea to the Jurisdiction.
The appellate court concluded that the burden to demonstrate the specific reasons why the extraordinary writ of injunction was required under these circumstances was with the relators.
In re Alamo Defenders Descedants Ass'n
Appellate: Civil, Constitution, Procedure
Texas 8th Court of Appeals
February 23, 2021
08-20-00188-CV
Jeff Alley
Published
The relators appealed the judgment of the trial court, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to stop construction on the project, contending generally that the defendants were violating provisions of the Texas Health & Safety Code because the grounds contained a historically documented mission cemetery predating the relator as well as the physical remains of the relator's members’ ancestors. The appellate court found that according to a response from the Attorney General, current archaeological activities were taking place at the project site in accordance with a plan that was already approved by the THC, and any human remains found were either being left in situ or are being kept on-site in a sealed vault at the relator. The appellate court determined that there was no indication that there was an active threat to any human remains, and the association had not explained how the current archaeological arrangement was improper or inadequate such that immediate injunctive relief or relief pending the duration of appeal was necessary. The appellate court concluded that the burden to demonstrate the specific reasons why the extraordinary writ of injunction was required under these circumstances was with the relators. Accordingly, the writ was denied.