The appellate court concluded that the appellant did not explain how the absence of the requested findings prevented him from making either of those challenges on appeal.
Phillips v. Phillips
Family
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
August 31, 2021
14-19-00618-CV
Charles Spain
Published
The appellant challenged the protective order rendered by the trial court in favor of the appellee. The appellate court held that because the order was based on the allegations of abuse directed towards a spouse, the appellant was entitled to appellate review. The appellate court noted that the appellant’s argument that the appellee filed her application in the wrong court was otherwise not a matter of fundamental error, and the appellant never timely challenged venue or dominant jurisdiction in the trial court, nor did he seek to transfer the application to the 246th District Court. The appellate court concluded that the appellant did not explain how the absence of the requested findings prevented him from making either of those challenges on appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s final protective order as challenged on appeal.
The appellate court concluded that the contempt warning portion of the trial court’s order was void and stricken from the judgment.
Jones v. Coppinger
Business, Contracts, Real Property, Torts
Texas 8th Court of Appeals
August 31, 2021
08-20-00040-CV
Jeff Alley
Published
The appellant and her deceased ex-husband were ordered to sell their primary residence pursuant to a divorce decree. They agreed to retain the appellee, a licensed real estate agent, to serve as their listing agent. On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial court's grant of the appellee’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing all four causes of action, and further granted the appellee’s request for an award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the parties’ contract. The appellate court noted that the appellant failed to come forward with sufficient summary judgment evidence to raise a question of fact on the damage element of any of her causes of action. The appellate court determined that since the appellant failed to come forward with sufficient summary judgment evidence to support any of her damages claim for the four causes of action, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on all four causes. The appellate court concluded that the contempt warning portion of the trial court’s order was void and stricken from the judgment. Accordingly, the court had stricken provisions from the attorney’s fee order, but affirmed the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.
The appellate court concluded that the appellants have not shown that the trial court erred in rendering a take-nothing judgment as to their counterclaim.
Hegar v. Xerox Corp.
Gov't/Administrative, Tax, Transportation
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
August 31, 2021
14-19-00358-CV
Randy Wilson
Published
In the following franchise-tax dispute, the taxable entity paid franchise taxes under protest and brought suit, asserting that the franchise tax rate applicable to the entity during Report Years 2008 and 2009 was 0.5% rather than 1.0%. The appellants, the comptroller and the attorney general counterclaimed, asserting that the taxable entity’s cost-of-good-sold deduction should have been less than the amounts reported by the entity in each of those years. The trial court ruled in the taxable entity’s favor on its claims and ordered that the appellants take nothing on their counterclaims. The appellate court noted that the appellants have not shown that the trial court erred in concluding for each report year that the total revenue from the appellee's activities in wholesale trade was greater than the total revenue from the appellee's activities in trades other than the wholesale trades. The appellate court determined that the appellants have not shown that the trial court erred in determining that the applicable franchise tax rate for the appellee during the Time Period at Issue was 0.5% rather than 1.0%. The appellate court concluded that the appellants have not shown that the trial court erred in rendering a take-nothing judgment as to their counterclaim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
The appellate court concluded that, as a matter of law, the appellee supplier was not entitled to judgment against the appellant based on the appellee supplier's fraud claim.
CCC Grp., Inc. v. Enduro Composites, Inc.
Appellate: Civil, Business, Contracts, Damages, Litigation: Personal Injury, Torts
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
August 31, 2021
14-19-00204-CV
Randy Wilson
Published
The appellant, a general contractor, appealed the trial court’s money judgment against the appellant and in favor of the appellee subcontractor and the appellee supplier based on a jury verdict in favor of the appellee subcontractor on its claim for breach of the subcontract and in favor of the appellee supplier on its claim for breach of a joint check agreement between the appellant and the appellees. The appellate court noted that the court sustained the part of the appellant's first issue in which the appellant asserted that the court should reverse the trial court’s judgment against the appellant on the appellee supplier's breach-of-contract claim based on the failure of the trial evidence to conclusively prove that the appellant waived the Complete Invoices Condition, and the legal insufficiency of the trial evidence to support a finding that the Complete Invoices Condition occurred. The appellate court concluded that, as a matter of law, the appellee supplier was not entitled to judgment against the appellant based on the appellee supplier's fraud claim. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part.
The appellate court concluded that the appellant failed to establish its defense that the appellees sued the wrong party when it impleaded the appellant into the lawsuit.
Scott v. Project Rose MSO, LLC
Appellate: Civil, Business, Contracts, Damages, Gov't/Administrative, Torts
Texas 12th Court of Appeals
August 30, 2021
12-20-00246-CV
James T. Worthen
Published
The hospital preemptively filed suit against the appellees, including claims for breach of the Consultant Agreement, a declaratory judgment that it had not breached the Consultant Agreement, and a request to wind up the first appellee company's business. The appellees filed a counterclaim against Texas Spine and Joint and added third-party claims against several third-party defendants, including the appellant. On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial court’s denial of its Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) motion to dismiss the counterclaim against it filed by the appellees. The appellate court noted that the TCPA applies to the appellees counterclaim, and that the appellees failed to satisfy its burden to make a prima facie case as to its promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance and quantum meruit causes of action as part of its counterclaim against the appellant. Accordingly, the appellant was entitled to at least some amount and measure of attorney’s fees under the TCPA. The appellate court found that the appellees were largely successful in demonstrating that its causes of action were either exempt from the TCPA or satisfying its burden of making a prima facie case on most of its causes of action. The appellate court concluded that the appellant failed to establish its defense that the appellees sued the wrong party when it impleaded the appellant into the lawsuit. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.
The appellate court agreed with the appellant that the trial court lacked authority to render judgment on his bill of review because the presiding judge did not hear the evidence on which she purported to render judgment.
Weiss v. Eichner
Appellate: Civil, Constitution, Gov't/Administrative
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
August 31, 2021
14-19-00849-CV
Charles Spain
Published
The appellant challenged the trial court’s reconsideration of an interlocutory order granting his bill of review and rendition of judgment dismissing his bill of review, arguing in two issues that the trial court lacked authority or power to take those actions. The appellate court noted that the trial court had the authority to reconsider its prior interlocutory order. The appellate court agreed with the appellant that the trial court lacked authority to render judgment on his bill of review because the presiding judge did not hear the evidence on which she purported to render judgment. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Since the appellant’s plea to the jurisdiction was only a procedural hurdle, the court made no conclusion regarding whether the merits of the appellee’s claim would satisfy the requisite notice and reasonableness standards under Section 101.060(a)(2) of the TTCA.
Texas v. Shook
Gov't/Administrative, Litigation: Personal Injury, Torts
Texas 1st Court of Appeals
August 31, 2021
01-19-00656-CV
Amparo Guerra
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court in a personal injury action, asking the appellate court to determine whether the conduct alleged fell within the waiver of governmental immunity in the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA). The appellee and his wife sued, alleging that its negligence and a premises defect caused the injuries the appellee sustained when he struck a tollway gate arm while riding his motorcycle on a Houston-area tollway. The trial court denied the appellant’s plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity. The appellate court found that the appellee’s cause of action was properly classified as a premises defect claim, and not one based on the use or condition of tangible property. The appellate court determined that because the appellant’s plea to the jurisdiction was only a procedural hurdle, the court made no conclusion regarding whether the merits of the appellee’s claim would satisfy the requisite notice and reasonableness standards under Section 101.060(a)(2) of the TTCA. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed, reversed and remanded.
The trial court reasonably concluded that the appellants did not establish the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, accordingly, it did not abuse its discretion in refusing to compel arbitration.
CC Rest., L.P. v. Olague
ADR, Civil Rights, Contracts, Employment
Texas 8th Court of Appeals
August 27, 2021
08-19-00285-CV
Yvonne T. Rodriguez
Published
The appellants filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration, and the trial court denied the motion and the appeal ensued. The appellate court noted that in the Agreement, there was no mutual promise to arbitrate between the appellants and the appellee. Further, the appellants did not give the appellee anything of value, besides continuing at-will employment and payment, in exchange for her agreement to arbitrate future disputes. The appellate court found that the purported agreement to arbitrate failed for lack of consideration. The appellate court concluded that the trial court reasonably found that the appellants did not establish the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. Accordingly, it did not abuse its discretion in refusing to compel arbitration, and thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
The appellate court determined that a defendant was given credit on his sentence for the time that he has spent in jail for the case from the time of his arrest and confinement until his sentence by the trial court.
Sledge v. State
Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 5th Court of Appeals
August 26, 2021
05-19-01398-CR
David Schenck
Published
The appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty of possession with intent to deliver heroin, possession with intent to deliver cocaine, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The first two offenses were enhanced by his status as a habitual offender and the use of a firearm during a drug offense, while the third offense was enhanced only by his status as a habitual offender. He was sentenced to twenty-eight years’ confinement in each case, with the sentences to run concurrently. The appellate court observed that there was no conceivable trial strategy to justify failing to object to the State’s deadly weapon and habitual offender allegations at the appellant’s second trial. The appellate court concluded the appellant established the first Strickland prong of deficient performance by his trial counsel. The appellate court determined that a defendant was given credit on his sentence for the time that he has spent in jail for the case from the time of his arrest and confinement until his sentence by the trial court. The appellate court modified the judgment in the heroin case. Accordingly, as modified, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgments of conviction and reversed and remanded for a new punishment hearing in all three cases.
The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of an extraneous offense, and any error in admitting disciplinary records was harmless under the facts of the case.
Thomas v. State
Constitution, Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
August 26, 2021
14-19-00685-CR
Frances Bourliot
Published
The appellant appealed his conviction for continuous violence against a family member. The appellate court noted that on its face, Article 38.371 did not violate the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of an extraneous offense, and any error in admitting disciplinary records was harmless under the facts of the case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
The appellate court found that viewing the evidence in the light favorable to the verdict, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the appellant should have discovered the appellees alleged wrongful conduct.
Sullivan v. Pound
Appellate: Civil, Contracts, Damages, Torts
Texas 4th Court of Appeals
August 25, 2021
04-20-00230-CV
Irene Rios
Published
The appellant filed suit against the appellees for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, common law fraud, fraudulent inducement, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent misrepresentation. The case was tried before a jury, and the jury found in favor of the appellant on her claims for promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent misrepresentation and awarded her damages. The appellant filed a motion to disregard the jury’s answers to question 18, arguing the date determined by the jury was not supported by the evidence. The trial court denied the appellant's motion to disregard the jury finding, determined the appellant's causes of action were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, and rendered a take-nothing judgment on all her claims. The appellate court found that viewing the evidence in the light favorable to the verdict, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the appellant should have discovered the appellees alleged wrongful conduct. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
The appellate court determined that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the appellant, and it properly overruled the appellant’s special appearance.
Cirrus Design Corp. v. Berra
Business, Torts
Texas 4th Court of Appeals
August 25, 2021
04-20-00399-CV
Irene Rios
Published
The appellant was a Minnesota-based aircraft manufacturer, which sued for products liability in Texas, after one of its planes was involved in a fatal crash in Bexar County, Texas. The appellant filed a special appearance, which the trial court denied. The appellate court observed that the appellant’s activities in Texas justify the conclusion that it could reasonably anticipate being called into a Texas court. The court concluded that the appellant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas. Further, both of the appellee’s theories of liability that the appellant originally designed and manufactured a defective plane and that the appellant distributed defective parts for installation and use in the appellee’s plane arose out of or relate to the appellant’s Texas activities. The appellate court determined that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the appellant, and it properly overruled the appellant’s special appearance. Accordingly, the trial court’s order denying the appellant’s special appearance was affirmed.
The appellate court exercised its inherent power to sever or strike those unconscionable provisions and rendered the remaining Arbitration Agreement legally valid.
Casa Ford, Inc. v. Warner
ADR, Appellate: Civil, Civil Rights, Contracts, Damages, Employment, Torts
Texas 8th Court of Appeals
August 23, 2021
08-20-00089-CV
Yvonne T. Rodriguez
Published
Arguing that the arbitration agreement at issue was valid and the employee's age discrimination claim fell within the agreement, the appellant appealed the trial court’s order denying its motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. The appellate court noted that the attorneys’ fees provisions in the Arbitration Agreement were substantively unconscionable. The appellate court found that because the Arbitration Agreement contained nonessential provisions which, in contravention of the appellee's statutory remedies, unconditionally mandate that each party pay its own attorneys’ fees, the court exercised its inherent power to sever or strike those unconscionable provisions and rendered the remaining Arbitration Agreement legally valid. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment, sever the two attorneys’ fees provisions from the Arbitration Agreement, and remanded with instructions to the trial court to enter an order consistent with the opinion.
The appellate court exercised its inherent power to sever or strike those unconscionable provisions and render the remaining Arbitration Agreement legally valid.
Casa Ford, Inc. v. Armendariz
ADR, Civil Rights, Contracts
Texas 8th Court of Appeals
August 23, 2021
08-20-00084-CV
Yvonne T. Rodriguez
Published
Arguing that the arbitration agreement at issue was valid and the appellee’s age discrimination claim fell within the agreement, the appellant appealed the trial court’s order denying its motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. The appellate court observed that the appellant met its initial burden to show, and the appellee did not dispute, that an arbitration agreement exists and the appellee’s age discrimination claim lies within its parameters. Further, the court found the attorneys’ fees provisions in the Arbitration Agreement were substantively unconscionable. The appellate court found that given the public policy favoring arbitration, severing the invalid clauses rather than invalidating the entire Arbitration Agreement was the appropriate judicial action when severance did not take from the main purpose of the agreement. Finally, because the Arbitration Agreement contains nonessential provisions which, in contravention of the appellee’s statutory remedies, unconditionally mandate each party pay its own attorneys’ fees, the court exercised its inherent power to sever or strike those unconscionable provisions and render the remaining Arbitration Agreement legally valid. Accordingly, the court upheld the Arbitration Agreement but strike the two attorneys’ fees provisions, reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded.
The appellate court concluded that the record showed the appellee did not seek summary judgment regarding the appellant’s class claims and did not address those claims in any way, and therefore, summary judgment was improper as to those claims.
Arce v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co.
Contracts, Insurance
Texas 7th Court of Appeals
August 24, 2021
07-19-00362-CV
Patrick A. Pirtle
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court, which granted summary judgment in favor of the appellee on her claims for breach of contract and violations of the Texas Insurance Code, as well as her claim for recovery of attorney’s fees and class action claims. The appellate court observed that the appellant’s cause of action itself was predicated on the issuance of an insurance policy and the payment of a premium. The appellate court determined that even if the trial court did err in admitting the summary judgment evidence, the court found such error would be harmless. The appellee was not entitled to summary judgment for another reason, and the undisputed summary judgment evidence showed the appellee asserted rescission well beyond the ninety-day period set forth in section 705.005 of the Code. The appellate court concluded that the record showed the appellee did not seek summary judgment regarding the appellant’s class claims and did not address those claims in any way, and therefore, summary judgment was improper as to those claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause.
The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in granting the appellee’s motion for partial summary judgment on his counterclaim and reversed that portion of the final judgment.
Gilbert v. Kalman
Contracts, Insurance
Texas 8th Court of Appeals
August 19, 2021
08-20-00001-CV
Jeff Alley
Published
The appellants were the personal representatives of the estate of the deceased. The appellants commenced the action against the appellee seeking recovery on a promissory note, seeking recovery for unpaid legal fees he claims that the deceased owed him. The appeal arose from summary judgments rendered by the trial court in favor of the appellee on his counterclaim for recovery of attorney’s fees and against the appellants on their claim for the promissory note. The appellate court observed that the affidavit was fairly part of the response that the trial court should have considered in resolving the motion for partial summary judgment. Nor would the requests for admission, even if deemed, preclude its consideration. The appellants did nothing more than refer to the appellee’s own evidence, as distinct from offering their own responsive evidence. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in granting the appellee’s motion for partial summary judgment on his counterclaim and reversed that portion of the final judgment. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed, reversed and remanded.
The appellate court found that under the plain language of Texas Government Code Section 839.101, a former judge sitting by assignment did not “currently hold a judicial office.”
Employees Ret. Sys. of Tex. v. Lowy
Constitution, Employment, Ethics, Gov't/Administrative
Texas 3rd Court of Appeals
August 19, 2021
03-20-00428-CV
Darlene Byrne
Published
The appellant appealed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the appellee reversing an administrative decision by the appellant's Executive Director. The appellate court noted that the appellee was not eligible to retire under the plain language of the statute, the court need not consider the trial court’s other determinations: that the Executive Director improperly adopted the appellant's staff’s proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law because they did not meet the required standards under the Administrative Procedures Act, relied on improper or untimely argument and evidence, or relied on grounds not included in the appellant's notice of hearing or motion for summary disposition. The appellate court found that under the plain language of Texas Government Code Section 839.101, a former judge sitting by assignment did not “currently hold a judicial office.” Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment and rendered judgment affirming the appellant's Executive Director’s order that the appellee did not hold a judicial office, and thus was not eligible to retire on that date under Section 839.101(a)(1).
The respondent abused his discretion by granting the RPIs’ motion for net worth discovery, having determined that no evidence supported a finding of substantial likelihood of success on the merits of an exemplary damages claim.
In re Bella Corp.
Constitution, Damages, Real Property, Torts
Texas 12th Court of Appeals
August 18, 2021
12-21-00090-CV
Brian Hoyle
Published
The Real Parties in Interest (RPIs) sued the relators for trespass to real property, unjust enrichment, private nuisance, negligence, negligence per se, and aiding and abetting based on allegations that the relators allowed their customers to test drive vehicles and parked on the RPIs’ neighboring land, and showcased merchandise on the RPIs’ land without permission. They sought a temporary injunction, a permanent injunction, and damages, including exemplary damages. The RPIs subsequently amended their petition to allege that the relators installed a commercial wash pit that drained wastewater onto the RPIs’ property. The relators filed the original proceeding to challenge the respondent’s order granting net worth discovery. The appellate court found that the respondent abused his discretion by granting the RPIs’ motion for net worth discovery, having determined that no evidence supported a finding of substantial likelihood of success on the merits of an exemplary damages claim. Accordingly, the court conditionally granted the relators’ petition for writ of mandamus.
The appellate court concluded that because he had not satisfied that burden, the court found no abuse of discretion in the bail amount ordered by the trial court.
Ex parte Estrada
Constitution, Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
August 19, 2021
14-20-00758-CR
Kevin Jewell
Published
The appellant brought the appeal from the trial court’s habeas corpus judgments, in association with setting bail at a combined $900,000 for three offenses and with considering a written summary of allegations authored by a detective who was not available to give testimony at his bail hearing. The appellate court observed that the trial court did not violate any of the appellant’s Confrontation Clause rights by admitting or considering the detective’s written factual summary at the appellant’s bail hearing. Further, the appellant has significant ties to the area. He has lived in Texas his entire life and has lived in Houston for years, and the trial court rightfully could have accounted for these circumstances in setting the appellant’s bail at a high amount. Further, the court acknowledges the ability to make bail factor did not itself demonstrate the trial court set an excessive bail amount, nor did it demonstrate the bail amount was otherwise unreasonable. The appellate court concluded that because he had not satisfied that burden, the court found no abuse of discretion in the bail amount ordered by the trial court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s habeas corpus judgments.
Because the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s special appearance, the court sustained the appellant’s sole issue, reversed the trial court’s order, and remanded.
Yahsi v. Visor Muhendislik Insaat Turizm Gida Ve Mekanik Taahhut Ticaret Ltd.
Courts, Torts
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
August 19, 2021
14-19-00406-CV
Randy Wilson
Published
The appellant brought the interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order denying his special appearance in a lawsuit filed against him by the appellee company and the second appellee company, whose sole member was the appellee company. The appellate court noted that the evidence was legally insufficient to support an implied finding that a substantial connection exists between the appellant’s purposeful contacts with Texas and the operative facts of the litigation. To the extent the trial court concluded it could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the appellant based on specific jurisdiction, the trial court erred. The trial court erred in impliedly determining that it could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the appellant based on specific and general jurisdiction. Because the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s special appearance, the court sustained the appellant’s sole issue, reversed the trial court’s order, and remanded.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational factfinder could have reasonably concluded the appellant's intoxication caused the decedent’s death and the injuries to his passengers.
Olalde v. State
Constitution, Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 4th Court of Appeals
August 18, 2021
04-20-00197-CR
Luz Elena D Chapa
Published
The appellant appealed her convictions for intoxication manslaughter and intoxication assault. The appellate court noted that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational factfinder could have reasonably concluded the appellant's intoxication caused the decedent’s death and the injuries to his passengers. The appellant's lone point of error was therefore overruled. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments.
The appellate court concluded that because the appellant was not a consumer under the DTPA, the court overruled the appellant’s sole issue on appeal and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
Miller v. Kim Tindall & Associates, LLC
Business, Consumer, Torts
Texas 4th Court of Appeals
August 18, 2021
04-20-00471-CV
Luz Elena D Chapa
Published
The appellant sued the appellee, alleging Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) claims. In a plea to the jurisdiction, the appellee argued the appellant was not a consumer under the DTPA. The appellee produced evidence in support of the plea, and the appellant responded with his own evidence. After a hearing, the trial court granted the appellee’s plea to the jurisdiction and rendered a final judgment dismissing the appellant’s claims. The appellate court found that the appellant asserted only DTPA claims against the appellee, and only consumers may allege DTPA claims. The appellate court concluded that because the appellant was not a consumer under the DTPA, the court overruled the appellant’s sole issue on appeal and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
The trial court very clearly abused its discretion by issuing the TRO, and the defendants have no adequate appellate remedy.
In re Abbott
Appellate: Civil, Constitution, Gov't/Administrative, Procedure
The Supreme Court of Texas
August 17, 2021
21-0667
James D Blacklock
Published
The plaintiffs in the suit were members of the Texas House of Representatives who denied the House a quorum by fleeing the state. They fled the state to escape the jurisdiction of the House, whose internal rules provided that absent members may be “arrested” and their attendance “secured and retained.” The plaintiffs sued the Governor and the Speaker of the House in Travis County trial court, seeking an injunction prohibiting their arrest, which granted an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) prohibiting the defendants from compelling the plaintiffs’ attendance by arrest or other confinement or restraint for the next fourteen days. The Supreme Court found that the court were provided with no reason to doubt that the framers of the court's constitution understood article III, Section 10 to operate just as it has been understood to operate in the many decades since its ratification—to authorize each chamber to compel the attendance of absent members, by physical compulsion if necessary. The court declined the plaintiffs’ invitation to undermine that foundational authority, which had long been embedded in the very structure of the court's government. The trial court very clearly abused its discretion by issuing the TRO, and the defendants have no adequate appellate remedy. Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus was conditionally granted, and the trial court was directed to immediately rescind the TRO.
The trial court’s interlocutory order denying the appellants’ plea to the jurisdiction was merged into the final judgment, and the appellants did not properly perfect an appeal from that final order, thus, the court concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
City of Brady v. Scott
Appellate: Civil, Criminal, Evidence, Gov't/Administrative, Procedure
Texas 8th Court of Appeals
August 16, 2021
08-20-00155-CV
Jeff Alley
Published
The case began with the seizure of $11,452 in cash by the appellant department from the appellee’s home. Many years later, the appellee filed a petition in the trial court pursuant to article 47.01a of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, to determine who owned the $11,452 in cash (hereinafter the Chapter 47 petition). Chapter 47 details a procedure for a trial court judge to determine the right of possession to property that was alleged to have been stolen. The appellant city and the appellant department (collectively referred to as the appellants) filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court denied in the same order in which it entered a final judgment granting the appellee’s Chapter 47 petition, finding that he had a superior right to the money. The appellants thereafter filed an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order denying its plea to the jurisdiction. The appellate court observed that the trial court’s interlocutory order denying the appellants’ plea to the jurisdiction was merged into the final judgment, and the appellants did not properly perfect an appeal from that final order, thus, the court concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Accordingly, the appellants’ appeal was dismissed.