The court conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the appellant's plea to the jurisdiction and motion to transfer signed by the trial court and to grant the plea to the jurisdiction and motion to transfer the case to the trial court.
In re H&S Hoke Ranch, LLC
Damages, Real Property
Texas 10th Court of Appeals
May 28, 2021
10-20-00237-CV
Tom Gray
Published
The appellant sought a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to set aside an order denying its plea to the jurisdiction and motion to transfer pursuant to Section 21.002 of the Property Code. The appellate court noted that having concluded that the county court at law in which the case was pending did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the appellant's counterclaims because the appellant alleged an amount in controversy in excess of the jurisdictional limits of the county court at law, mandamus relief was appropriate to spare the parties and the public the time and money spent on fatally flawed proceedings in the county court at law. Therefore, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the appellant's plea to the jurisdiction and motion to transfer signed by the trial court and to grant the plea to the jurisdiction and motion to transfer the case to the trial court within twenty-one days of the opinion.
The Supreme Court held that the relators had no adequate remedy by appeal.
In re K & L Auto Crushers, LLC
Appellate: Civil, Damages, Employment, Health Care, Insurance, Litigation: Personal Injury, Torts
The Supreme Court of Texas
May 28, 2021
19-1022
Jeffrey S. Boyd
Published
The plaintiff alleged he was injured in a motor-vehicle collision with a tractor-trailer rig driven by the relator individual. The plaintiff sued the relators, the company and the individual. After the plaintiff served medical-expense affidavits under Section 18.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the relators served counter-affidavits challenging the amounts billed as unreasonable. The relators then served subpoenas on the plaintiff's healthcare providers, requesting production of information related to their billing practices and rates over a period of several years. The subpoenas included multiple requests, some with multiple sub-requests, and sought a wide array of information. The trial court sustained the providers’ objections and quashed the subpoenas without explaining the basis for its ruling. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration without explanation. The Supreme Court noted that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the requested discovery, as narrowed in the relators motion for reconsideration and explained at the hearing, considering the circumstances and the applicability of our reasoning in North Cypress to the case. Further, the court held that the relators had no adequate remedy by appeal. Accordingly, the court conditionally granted the writ of mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its order denying the relators motion for reconsideration.
The grievances were timely filed with the school district and the court did not resolve the parties’ disputes about the legality of the respondent school's teacher evaluation system.
Davis v. Morath
Contracts, Education, Gov't/Administrative
The Supreme Court of Texas
May 28, 2021
19-1035
James D Blacklock
Published
The respondent denied the grievances as untimely, concluding that their untimely presentation to the local school board deprived him of jurisdiction. The teachers appealed to trial court, which affirmed the respondent commissioner's decision. The appellate court held that the respondent commissioner had jurisdiction over the grievances. It further held that some of the grievances were untimely and must be dismissed but that others were timely and could proceed. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court that the commissioner had jurisdiction to hear the teachers’ appeal. Further, the court held that the grievances were timely filed with the school district and the court did not resolve the parties’ disputes about the legality of the respondent school's teacher evaluation system. Accordingly, the decision of the appellate court was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the matter was remanded to the commissioner.
The trial court erred in denying the petitioner's motion to compel arbitration.
Aerotek, Inc. v. Boyd
ADR, Civil Rights, Contracts, Employment, Gov't/Administrative, Technology
The Supreme Court of Texas
May 28, 2021
20-0290
Nathan L. Hecht
Published
The petitioner hired employees globally by the hundreds of thousands to work as contractors for client companies. To keep hiring efficient, the petitioner worked with a software developer to build an online-only hiring application. The respondents each completed the petitioner's computerized hiring application on his own. The petitioner hired all four respondents to work as contractors on a construction project for the petitioner's client, the company. All four were terminated not long after starting work and sued the petitioner, the company, and others for racial discrimination and retaliation. The Supreme Court noted that the petitioner's evidence of the security procedures for its hiring application and its operation was such that reasonable people could not differ in concluding that the respondents could not have completed their hiring applications without signing the MAAs. The respondents' simple denials were no evidence otherwise. Further, the petitioner conclusively established that the respondents signed, and therefore consented to, the MAAs. Lastly, the trial court erred in denying the petitioner's motion to compel arbitration. Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court was reversed and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Because the appellant accepted benefits under the deceased's will, the trial court properly dismissed her challenge to its validity.
In re Estate of Johnson
Gov't/Administrative, Real Property, Wills/Trusts/Probate
The Supreme Court of Texas
May 28, 2021
20-0424
Jane N. Bland
Published
The appellant, a beneficiary under a will, sought to circumvent the rule by contending that the bequest she accepted was worth less than the inheritance she would receive should she succeed in nullifying the will. The trial court rejected the argument and dismissed the contestant’s suit for lack of standing. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court noted that the appellant was put to an election: either sought to set the will aside or accept the benefits the deceased bequeathed to her. She chose the latter. As a result, she must adopt the whole contents of the instrument, so far as it concerns her, conforming to its provisions, and renouncing every right inconsistent with it. Further, because the appellant accepted benefits under the deceased's will, the trial court properly dismissed her challenge to its validity. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and rendered judgment dismissing the suit.
The appellate court determined that the State failed to meet its burden of showing that the Judge continued to have authority to sit in the underlying cases past the expiration of the assignment orders.
In re State ex rel. Wice
Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 1st Court of Appeals
May 27, 2021
01-20-00477-CR
Julie Countiss
Published
The relator, on behalf of the State, filed a petition for writ of mandamus, requesting that the appelate court vacate an order signed by the Honorable Judge of the 177th District Court of Harris County, Texas that vacated a previous change of venue order and returned the underlying cases to Collin County, Texas. The relator also requested that the court compel the trial court to rule on certain motions. The appellate court found that because the Dallas Court of Appeals did not resolve whether the Judge had the authority to order a change of venue after the expiration of his assignment to the underlying cases, the law of the case doctrine did not prevent the court from resolving that issue. The appellate court concluded that they could be reasonably read to agree that Judge’s assignment to the 416th District Court of Collin County was to end. Finally, the appellate court determined that the State failed to meet its burden of showing that the Judge continued to have authority to sit in the underlying cases past the expiration of the assignment orders. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for writ of mandamus.
Because the court plainly failed to apply the relevant penal law to the facts of the case, the charge was erroneous.
Durden v. State
Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
May 27, 2021
14-19-00388-CR
Randy Wilson
Published
The appellant challenged her murder conviction that resulted in a 35-year prison sentence. The appellate court noted that the evidence that a rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the appellant’s death using a knife or sharp object, and was not justified in using deadly force. The appellate couirt found that the trial court’s charge excluded from the jury’s consideration the theory for which there was some evidence: self-defense to the prevention of a sexual assault. Because the court plainly failed to apply the relevant penal law to the facts of the case, the charge was erroneous. The record showed that the charge error resulted in some harm to appellant because her entire case was based on her theory of self-defense to prevent the vicitm’s sexual assault (or aggravated sexual assault) such that that was the only contested issue and the court’s charge effectively deprived the jurors’ consideration of that theory, making the rejection of that defense inevitable. Finally having jurisdiction to consider the argument, the court overruled the State’s cross complaint. Accordingly the trial court’s judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.
The appellate court upheld the ruling by the trial court overruling the appellant’s Batson challenge.
Gomez v. Austin
Civil Rights, Employment, Procedure
Texas 8th Court of Appeals
May 26, 2021
08-19-00250-CV
Yvonne T. Rodriguez
Published
The appellant appealed the trial court’s decision overruling his Batson challenge on a peremptory strike exercised by the City at trial. The appellant sued for discrimination based on ethnicity and national origin after the appellee terminated his employment. The appellate court held that it appeared that the trial court exercised proper discretion, guided by the law outlined in Batson, and their progeny and ruled reasonably based on their principles. While a different trial judge may have ruled differently based on the same assessment, it was improper as the reviewing court, to substitute the opinion for the trial court’s where it did not act arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to guiding principles. Therefore, the court upheld the ruling by the trial court overruling the appellant’s Batson challenge. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.
The appellate court concluded that the appellant had not raised a fact issue as to the existence of a reasonable accommodation that would have allowed him to do his job.
Dillard v. SNC-Lavalin Engineers & Constructors Inc.
Civil Rights, Employment, Procedure
Texas 1st Court of Appeals
May 27, 2021
01-20-00372-CV
Gordon Goodman
Published
The appellant sued the appellee his former employer, for disability discrimination, alleging that the appellee unlawfully refused to reasonably accommodate his diabetes. The appellee moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The appellate court found that because the appellant has not introduced any evidence that his diabetes substantially limited his endocrine function or another of major life activity, he had not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was disabled under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). Further, given that alcohol testing was time-sensitive, and delay will alter its results, an employee’s notice of disability and request for an alternative method of testing was untimely if made only after another method has yielded a positive result. The appellate court concluded that the appellant had not raised a fact issue as to the existence of a reasonable accommodation that would have allowed him to do his job. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.
The appellant’s own construction of the statute allowed for meaning beyond a waiver of immunity because it granted the appellant the authority to condemn both public and private land.
Hidalgo Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 3 v. Hidalgo Cnty. Water Irrigation Dist. No. 1
Gov't/Administrative, Procedure, Real Property
Texas 13th Court of Appeals
May 27, 2021
13-20-00355-CV
Gina M. Benavides
Published
In the case, the appellate court must decide whether a governmental entity was immune from suit to condemn its property. The appellant filed a condemnation proceeding against the appellee seeking a permanent subterranean easement for the purpose of installing a water pipeline. The appellate court found that the appellant attempted to distinguish trespass-to-try-title suits from condemnation proceedings but, in the end, both were “suits for land.” To be sure, a trespass-to-try-title suit was also a quasi in rem proceeding to the extent that it adjudicated the parties’ competing title claims. To the contrary, the appellant’s own construction of the statute allowed for meaning beyond a waiver of immunity because it granted the appellant the authority to condemn both public and private land. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment was affirmed.
The appellant did not otherwise conclusively establish as a matter of law that the appellee in fact signed the purported note.
Silverio v. Silverio
Contracts, Family
Texas 8th Court of Appeals
May 26, 2021
08-20-00038-CV
Gina M. Palafox
Published
The appellant appealed the trial court’s final judgment in favor of the appellee in a suit brought by the appellant for payment on a defaulted unsecured promissory note. The appellate court noted that there was some evidence to support the trial court’s implied finding that the appellee did not sign the promissory note based on the evidence provided and deferring to the trial court’s resolution of the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and testimony. The appellant did not otherwise conclusively establish as a matter of law that the appellee in fact signed the purported note. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.
Because the trial court did not err granting appellees' summary judgment on the appellants’ civil barratry claims based on the statute of limitations, the trial court did not err in granting appellees summary judgment on appellants’ breach of fiduciary duty claims.
Brumfield v. Williamson
Appellate: Civil, Procedure, Torts
Texas 1st Court of Appeals
May 27, 2021
01-19-00336-CV
Julie Countiss
Published
The appellants challenged the trial court’s rendition of summary judgment in favor of appellees in the appellants’ suit against appellees for civil barratry, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and breach of fiduciary duty. The appellate court found that appellees conclusively proved that appellants’ civil barratry claims brought under the original version of Texas Government Code section 82.0651(a) accrued more than four years before appellants filed suit and appellees established that neither the discovery rule, the Hughes tolling doctrine, nor the McClung tolling doctrine applied to appellants’ claims. The appellate court determined that because the trial court properly granted appellees summary judgment on appellants’ civil barratry claims, the trial court did not err in granting appellees summary judgment on appellants’ derivative civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims. Because the trial court did not err granting appellees' summary judgment on the appellants’ civil barratry claims based on the statute of limitations, the trial court did not err in granting appellees summary judgment on appellants’ breach of fiduciary duty claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and dismissed in part.
A new punishment hearing was required to allow the trial court to assess punishment under the correct range.
Flowers v. State
Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 1st Court of Appeals
May 27, 2021
01-18-01059-CR
Gordon Goodman
Published
The appellant appealed from two judgments of conviction, one for aggravated robbery and one for possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, contending that the trial court erred in assessing his punishment for the latter offense by failing to apply the correct punishment range. The appellate court observed that the record lacked any indication as to what punishment the trial court would have assessed for the drug offense had the trial court correctly analyzed the law. Further, the trial court thought the range of punishment was between 15 to 99 years when it actually was between 10 to 99 years. In assessing punishment at 15 years’ imprisonment, the trial court assessed a punishment that lies within the permissible range of punishment. But the record did not disclose whether the trial court would have assessed the same or a different punishment had it understood the correct punishment range. Thus, a new punishment hearing was required to allow the trial court to assess punishment under the correct range. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed, reversed and remanded.
As to the appellant’s conviction for sexual assault of a child, the court concluded that the record presented no arguably meritorious grounds for review and that the appeal was frivolous.
Whillhite v. State
Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 3rd Court of Appeals
May 27, 2021
03-18-00766-CR
Chari L. Kelly
Published
The appellant was charged with two offenses, sexual assault of a child, and online solicitation of a minor, section 33.021(b). After the appellant pled guilty to both offenses, the trial court placed him on deferred-adjudication community supervision for ten years. The appellant did not appeal from the trial court’s deferred-adjudication order. The appellate court observed that a deferred-adjudication order based on Section 33.021(b) of the Penal Code a statute that had been declared unconstitutional by the criminal appellate court was void and under the void judgment exception, may be collaterally attacked as such in a revocation-proceedings appeal, based on the precedent from the Court. Because there was no valid law upon which to base the appellant’s conviction for online solicitation of a minor, the court reversed the judgment of adjudication as to the conviction and rendered a judgment of acquittal for the offense. Further, as to the appellant’s conviction for sexual assault of a child, the court concluded that the record presented no arguably meritorious grounds for review and that the appeal was frivolous. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part, reversed, and rendered in part on remand.
Because the court held that the trial court did not err granting the appellees' summary judgment on the appellants’ civil barratry claims based on the statute of limitations, the trial court did not err in granting the appellees' summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claims.
Gandy v. Williamson
Contracts, Gov't/Administrative, Torts
Texas 1st Court of Appeals
May 27, 2021
01-19-00335-CV
Julie Countiss
Published
The appellants challenged the trial court’s rendition of summary judgment in favor of the appellees, in the appellants’ suit against the appellees for civil barratry, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and breach of fiduciary duty. The appellate court observed that the appellees conclusively proved that the appellants’ civil barratry claims brought under the original version of Texas Government Code section 82.0651(a) accrued more than four years before the appellants filed suit and the appellees established that neither the discovery rule, the Hughes tolling doctrine, nor the McClung tolling doctrine applied to the appellants’ claims. Further, because the court has held that the trial court properly granted the appellees summary judgment on the appellants’ civil barratry claims, the court held that the trial court did not err in granting the appellees summary judgment on the appellants’ derivative civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims. Finally, because the court held that the trial court did not err granting the appellees' summary judgment on the appellants’ civil barratry claims based on the statute of limitations, the trial court did not err in granting the appellees' summary judgment on the appellants’ breach of fiduciary duty claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
The court noted that the appellant failed to preserve error in the case because he failed to point to the specific evidence in the record that raised the lesser-included offense, even after he was asked to do so by the trial court.
Williams v. State
Constitution, Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
May 26, 2021
PD-0477-19
David C. Newell
Published
After a jury trial, the appellant was found guilty of continuous trafficking of persons and was sentenced to fifty years in prison. The appellant had testified that he committed no offense at all. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of human trafficking of persons, reversed the judgment of the trial court, and remanded the cause for a new trial. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the court have previously held that a trial court had no duty to sua sponte instruct on a lesser-included offense. Requested for such instructions were matters of trial strategy that were treated like defensive instructions. Accordingly, it was incumbent upon defense counsel to preserve error on his requested instruction. Further, the appellant failed to preserve error in the case because he failed to point to the specific evidence in the record that raised the lesser-included offense, even after he was asked to do so by the trial court. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.
The appellate court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for serious mental injury and Section 22.04 (a) (2) provided explicit standards for those who apply them.
Ex Parte Hammons
Constitution, Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 10th Court of Appeals
May 26, 2021
10-19-00362-CR
John E. Neill
Published
The appellant was charged under Tex. Penal Code Ann. Section 22.04 (a) (2) with the offense of injury to a child. The appellant filed an Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus arguing that Section 22.04 (a) (2) was unconstitutional on its face. The appellant appealed the trial court’s order denying relief. The appellate court noted that “serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury” was not impermissibly vague. Ordinary citizens understand the meaning of “deficiency” “impairment” and “injury.” Modifying those words with “mental” did not create an ambiguity because ordinary citizens would be able understand those terms as they relate to the mind. Further, the statute required that the mental deficiency, impairment, or injury be serious. The appellate court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for serious mental injury and Section 22.04 (a) (2) provided explicit standards for those who apply them. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
The plain language of Section 3.406(b) of the Family Code allowed for a “court to impose an equitable lien on the property of a benefited marital estate to secure a claim for reimbursement.”
In re Estate of Baker
Real Property, Wills/Trusts/Probate
Texas 10th Court of Appeals
May 26, 2021
10-18-00215-CV
Matt Johnson
Published
The deceased died survived by his wife and two appellant daughters from a prior marriage. His last will and testament disposed of his one-half of the community property and all of his separate property and the will directed that his wife receive a life estate in one-third of the minerals and the entire surface of the 32.8-acre separate property tract of land the deceased had inherited. The appellate court noted that the reimbursement claims may be waived by premarital or marital property agreements that satisfy the requirements of Chapter 4 of the Family Code. There was no reference in the record that a premarital or marital property agreement existed between the deceased and his wife. As such his wife was entitled to assert her claim for reimbursement, and the trial court had statutory authority to grant a claim for reimbursement. Further, pursuant to Section 3.402(c), the deceased's separate property estate was prohibited from claiming an offset against community estate contributions for the wife's use and enjoyment of the residence because it was owned by the deceased separate property estate. Additionally, the plain language of Section 3.406(b) of the Family Code allowed for a “court to impose an equitable lien on the property of a benefited marital estate to secure a claim for reimbursement.” Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The appellate court concluded that the evidence was legally insufficient to support a finding that the video depicted a “lewd exhibition of the genitals” as defined in the jury’s charge.
Romo v. State
Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 4th Court of Appeals
May 26, 2021
04-19-00772-CR
Liza A. Rodriguez
Published
Following a jury trial, the appellant was convicted in Count I of continuous sexual abuse of a child younger than fourteen years of age, in Count II of indecency with a child, and in Count III of possession of child pornography. The appelate court observed tht the appellant did not object at trial to the admission of the “Nudist HDV” DVD. To preserve error, “a party must object each time the inadmissible evidence is offered or obtain a running objection.” Because the appellant failed to object at the time the video was admitted, he waived any error on appeal. Further, given the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have reasonably believed the victim’s testimony that she was sexually abused and concluded that her behavioral issues were the result of sexual abuse. The appellate court concluded that the evidence was legally insufficient to support a finding that the video depicted a “lewd exhibition of the genitals” as defined in the jury’s charge. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part, reversed, and rendered in part.
Even assuming arguendo that the appellants agreed to the substance of the Application, his agreement was immaterial because a party who agreed to a void order has agreed to nothing.
Grounds v. First Groundrock Royalties, LLC
Appellate: Civil, Business, Contracts, Procedure
Texas 4th Court of Appeals
May 26, 2021
04-20-00567-CV
Patricia O. Alvarez
Published
In the interlocutory appeal of a business opportunity usurpation case, the appellants alleged the temporary injunction order was void for failure to follow TEX. R. CIV. P. 683’s requirements, and the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to dissolve the temporary injunction. The appellate court held that the order’s reference to the Application did not satisfy TEX. R. CIV. P. 683’s requirement that the order specifically stated “the reasons why injury will be suffered if the interlocutory relief is not ordered.” Therefore, the order was void, and the trial court abused its discretion by failing to apply the law correctly. Finally, even assuming arguendo that the appellants agreed to the substance of the Application, his agreement was immaterial because a party who agreed to a void order has agreed to nothing. Accordingly, the court declared the temporary injunction order void, dissolved the temporary injunction, and remanded the cause.
The trial court was without jurisdiction to grant the appellee’s motion for shock probation.
State v. Bronson
Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 6th Court of Appeals
May 26, 2021
06-20-00135-CR
Josh Morriss, III
Published
The appellee pled guilty to theft of at least $150,000.00, but less than $300,000.00, a second degree felony. The State appealed from the trial court’s order suspending execution of the appellee’s prison sentence and placing her on community supervision (shock probation). The appellate court agreed with its sister court’s reasoning in Temple, and likewise concluded that the Texas Supreme Court’s emergency orders did not allow a court to create jurisdiction for itself when jurisdiction would otherwise be absent. As a result, the trial court was without jurisdiction to grant the appellee’s motion for shock probation. Accordingly the court vacated the trial court’s order of shock probation, leaving in place the original judgment.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the relator’s plea to the jurisdiction or Rule 39 motion to abate.
In re Occidental W. Tex. Overthrust, Inc.
Appellate: Civil, Constitution, Procedure, Torts
Texas 8th Court of Appeals
May 24, 2021
08-20-00130-CV
Yvonne T. Rodriguez
Published
The relator filed a motion for permission to file an interlocutory appeal, which was also denied. The relator filed a petition for writ of mandamus, complaining that the trial court abused its discretion by denying its plea to the jurisdiction and its motion to abate. In the following mandamus proceeding, the relators challenged the trial court’s denial of their plea to the jurisdiction and, in the alternative, motion to abate the proceedings pursuant to TEX.R.CIV.P. 39(a). The appellate court observed that the relator was not entitled to mandamus relief for the trial court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction because it had failed to demonstrate that it lacked an adequate remedy by appeal. Absent an extraordinary situation, mandamus would not issue to correct a trial court’s denial of a plea to the jurisdiction, as an appeal would generally be an adequate remedy. Further, because the existence of necessary parties under Rule 39 was an evidentiary issue for the trial court, in order to succeed on mandamus, the relator must show that the evidence before the trial court dictated only one possible outcome as a matter of law. Lastly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the relator’s plea to the jurisdiction or Rule 39 motion to abate. Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus was denied.
That deletion removed the broadest category of connection, thereby requiring future TCPA movants to establish a closer nexus between the claims against them and the communications they point to as their exercise of protected rights.
ML Dev, LP v. Ross Dress For Less, Inc.
Appellate: Civil, Constitution, Contracts, Corporations, Evidence, Procedure, Torts
Texas 1st Court of Appeals
May 25, 2021
01-20-00773-CV
Sarah Beth Landau
Published
The following was a Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) case decided under the version of the statute, where a group of the first appellants, developer entities, were sued to force them to grant easement rights. They moved for dismissal on the argument that they were sued based on or in response to their exercise of the right of free speech and the right to petition. The appellate court observed that that the first appellants could not draw an adequate connection between their statements and the appellee’s legal claims to invoke the TCPA. Their alleged statements may have accompanied the denial of easement access. Furthermore, the court could not agree that the appellee’s suit for easement rights was based on or in response to these communications. Instead, they were based on and in response to the first appellants’ block of easement access. Lastly, that deletion removed the broadest category of connection, thereby requiring future TCPA movants to establish a closer nexus between the claims against them and the communications they point to as their exercise of protected rights. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.
The Supreme Court found that the Texas courts have long required parties to bear their own attorney’s fees under the American Rule by “prohibiting fee awards unless specifically provided by contract or statute.”
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Irwin
Appellate: Civil, Contracts, Damages, Insurance, Litigation: Personal Injury, Torts
The Supreme Court of Texas
May 21, 2021
19-0885
John P. Devine
Published
The petitioner appealed the judgment of the trial court which acknowledged the petitioner's payment of its policy limits and court costs and awarded the respondent his attorney’s fees. The petitioner appealed the award of attorney’s fees. The appellate court affirmed the award, holding that the UDJA was properly invoked to determine the respondent's entitlement to UIM benefits under the policy and a proper basis for the award of attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court noted that while the court agreed that the respondent's suit was not for breach of contract and that Chapter 38 did not apply, the court did not agree that the award there was erroneous or otherwise violated the American Rule. Further, the court found that the Texas courts have long required parties to bear their own attorney’s fees under the American Rule by “prohibiting fee awards unless specifically provided by contract or statute.” The appellate court did not err in affirming the trial court’s judgment. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.
The Supreme Court confirmed that attorney immunity provided a defense to a non-client’s claims based on an attorney’s conduct that constituted the provision of “legal” services involving the unique office, professional skill, training, and authority of an attorney.
Haynes & Boone, LLP v. NFTD, LLC
Contracts, Damages, Intellectual Property, Patents/Trademarks, Torts
The Supreme Court of Texas
May 21, 2021
20-0066
Jeffrey S. Boyd
Published
The respondent appealed the judgment of the trial court which granted the petitioners' summary judgment and dismissed all the claims against them. The Supreme Court confirmed that attorney immunity provided a defense to a non-client’s claims based on an attorney’s conduct that constituted the provision of “legal” services involving the unique office, professional skill, training, and authority of an attorney and the attorney engaged in to fulfill the attorney’s duties in representing the client within an adversarial context in which the client and the non-client did not share the same interests. Further, in light of the defense’s purposes, the court held that it applied to claims based on conduct the attorney performed in a non-litigation context, so long as the conduct qualified as this “kind” of conduct. Accordingly, the court reversed the appellate court's judgment holding that attorney immunity did not apply in the non-litigation context, and the court remanded the case to that court to consider whether the summary-judgment evidence conclusively established that the conduct at issue there qualified as that “kind” of conduct.
The Supreme Court concluded that the child's father did not contest that termination of his parental rights was in the child's best interest.
In re J.F.-G.
Gov't/Administrative, Juvenile
The Supreme Court of Texas
May 21, 2021
20-0378
Jane N. Bland
Published
When the child was born, her father was a fugitive, having failed to report to prison to serve a four-year sentence for selling drugs. The child's father emerged from prison when the child was a pre-teen, happily situated with her foster family and her half-sisters. And although the child's father took strides to reintegrate into the community and the child's life, the trial court shortly thereafter terminated his parental rights. The court found that the child's father had “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” It further found that termination of her father’s parental rights was in the child's best interest. The appellate court affirmed, holding that sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s decision. The Supreme Court found that although her father’s strides toward overcoming his past conduct were important in evaluating the child's best interests, his rehabilitation did not negate his past criminal conduct and incarceration such that a trial court could not consider them to have been endangering to the child. Further, based on the evidence before it, the trial court reasonably could have formed the firm belief that the child's father engaged in endangering conduct under subsection (E). The Supreme Court concluded that the child's father did not contest that termination of his parental rights was in the child's best interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court.
The Supreme Court declined to review the sanctions award at that time, as it was entirely possible the court decision would have no effect on the ultimate outcome.
Landry's, Inc. v. Animal Legal Defense Fund
Appellate: Civil, Business, Constitution, Damages, Evidence, Procedure, Torts
The Supreme Court of Texas
May 21, 2021
19-0036
James D Blacklock
Published
The plaintiff appealed the judgment of the trial court which granted the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) motions to dismiss and denied the plaintiff’s request for discovery. The trial court also awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants. The Supreme Court observed that because neither the judicial-proceedings privilege nor the attorney immunity defense applied there, the court remand the defamation claims to the appellate court to determine whether the plaintiff’s met its burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence each essential element of its defamation per se claims. Further, although the plaintiff’s challenged the remitted award in the Court, resolved the sanctions dispute at that time would be premature. Furthermore, because the court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s defamation claims, the possibility now exists that those claims would survive the TCPA motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court declined to review the sanctions award at that time, as it was entirely possible the court decision would have no effect on the ultimate outcome. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
The relator lacked an adequate remedy by appeal and conditionally granted the mandamus directing the trial court to sustain the plea to the jurisdiction and dismiss the suit.
In re Roman Catholic Diocese of El Paso
Constitution
Texas 8th Court of Appeals
May 17, 2021
08-19-00244-CV
Jeff Alley
Published
The relator filed a plea to the jurisdiction contending that the suit should be dismissed under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. In the mandamus proceeding the court decided whether a court could hear claimed arose out of the reduction of a priest’s payments from the local the relator. The claims were premised on the application of Texas’s statutory age discrimination law and common law fraud. The appellate court found that the Bishop looked to canon law to guide his discretion in setting that amount. So whether the payment was called a salary, wage, non-employee compensation, or charity, its amount was determined by the Bishop applying canon law. Further, because the decisional process in the case strikes at the core of the the relator’s internal governance and turned on the application of canon law, the trial court below should have abstained from the dispute. Lastly, the relator lacked an adequate remedy by appeal and conditionally granted the mandamus directing the trial court to sustain the plea to the jurisdiction and dismiss the suit. Accordingly, the court concluded the claims were barred by ecclesiastical abstention.
Without the benefit of any further authority favorable to the respondent, the court could not find the trial court abused its discretion.
In re A.N.G.
Family, Juvenile
Texas 8th Court of Appeals
May 19, 2021
08-19-00088-CV
Gina M. Palafox
Published
The respondent father and the petitioner mother were the parents of a minor child. The respondent complained the trial court committed reversible error in granted a directed verdict favorable to the petitioner on matters pertaining to the parties’ joint managing conservatorship. The respondent also complained the trial court erred in modifying the geographic restriction imposed on the child’s primary residency, erred in failing to consider the report of the court-appointed counselor, erred in determining awards for child support and medical support, and erred in awarding attorney’s fees. The appellate court found that the evidence presented by the respondent failed to raise triable issues of fact for the jury’s determination of a modification of the terms and conditions of conservatorship; and thus, the trial court did not err in granting a directed verdict against the respondent on his request for modification of the parties’ conservatorship. Further, the trial court did not invade issues within the province of the jury. Without the benefit of any further authority favorable to the respondent, the court could not find the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.
The appellate court concluded that the evidence was factually sufficient to support the jury’s damages awards for past and future physical pain and mental anguish.
Four J's Cmty. Living Ctr., Inc. v. Wagner
Appellate: Civil, Damages, Torts
Texas 1st Court of Appeals
May 20, 2021
01-19-00346-CV
Julie Countiss
Published
The appellants challenged the trial court’s judgment, entered after a jury trial, in favor of the appellee incapacitated adult, in the appellee’s suit for negligence. In three issues, the appellants’ contended that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding that the first appellant was personally liable for negligence either as a landlord or as an agent of the second appellant’s, the evidence was factually insufficient to support the jury’s award of damages for past and future disfigurement and past and future physical pain and mental anguish, and the trial court erred in not applying the damages cap under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 74.301 as to the second defendant’s. The appellate court found that the court need not consider whether the evidence supported a finding of negligence against the first appellant as an owner, employee, and agent of the second defendant’s. The appellate court concluded that the evidence was factually sufficient to support the jury’s damages awards for past and future physical pain and mental anguish. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.
The appellate court found that the court determined the proceeding was properly considered a petition for writ of mandamus , however, the court dismissed the first relator from the proceeding for lack of standing.
In re DEK-M-Nationwide, Ltd.
Constitution, Creditor/Debtor, Real Property, Tax
Texas 14th Court of Appeals
May 20, 2021
14-19-00571-CV
Tracy Christopher
Published
The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial court, filing a petition for writ of mandamus challenging two orders which granted summary judgments in post-judgment proceedings in a delinquent-tax suit. After the delinquent-tax suit was filed, the first relator became a judgment debtor of the original tax debtor and later obtained a security interest in certain of the debtor’s property. The first relator allegedly foreclosed on its lien and sold the properties to the second relator, but in accordance with the final judgment in the case, Colorado County Central Appraisal District (CCCAD) foreclosed the tax lien on the same properties, which were sold to the buyers. The appellate court found that the court determined the proceeding was properly considered a petition for writ of mandamus , however, the court dismissed the first relator from the proceeding for lack of standing. Accordingly, the court denied the second relator’s petition for writ of mandamus.
The appellate court concluded that because the same or similar allegedly hearsay testimony was admitted elsewhere, without objection, any error in admitting the detective sergeant’s testimony regarding statements made by the juvenile was cured.
Rodriguez v. State
Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 10th Court of Appeals
May 20, 2021
10-18-00253-CR
John E. Neill
Published
The appellant challenged her conviction for hindering apprehension or prosecution. The appellate court observed that the appellant had the opportunity to avoid the prejudice and impairment but chose not to, and therefore, the court held that the appellant waived her article 39.14(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure complaint in the issue. Further, the appellant’s conviction for felony hindering apprehension or prosecution was supported by sufficient evidence. The appellate court concluded that because the same or similar allegedly hearsay testimony was admitted elsewhere, without objection, any error in admitting the detective sergeant’s testimony regarding statements made by the juvenile was cured. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Without the inadmissible hearsay evidence, there was no evidence presented to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard to deny bond, and the trial court abused its discretion by remanding the appellant without bond.
Ex parte Trevino
Constitution, Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas 4th Court of Appeals
May 19, 2021
04-20-00544-CR
Patricia O. Alvarez
Published
The appellant was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. While on release, the appellant allegedly violated his release conditions, and the trial court revoked bond. The appellant filed a motion to set bail and a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus. At the hearing on the motion to set bail, the appellant objected to the trial court considering any hearsay testimony, but the trial court overruled his objections. After the hearing, the trial court denied the appellant’s application. The appellate court found that the trial court erred when it admitted hearsay evidence to deny the appellant’s bond. Without the inadmissible hearsay evidence, there was no evidence presented to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard to deny bond, and the trial court abused its discretion by remanding the appellant without bond. Accordingly, the court denied the appellant’s request that it set bond and remanded.
The criminal appellate court concluded that a rational trier-of-fact could have inferred the appellant knew of the order at issue and that retaining his child violated that order.
Hammack v. State
Criminal, Evidence, Procedure
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
May 19, 2021
PD-0636-19
David C. Newell
Published
The State charged the appellant with interference with child custody and a jury convicted him and sentenced him to two years’ confinement in state jail. The trial court placed the appellant on community supervision for a term of five years and the terms and conditions of his probation specified that the appellant could not live with the child (or any of his children) or have unsupervised access to any child under eighteen years of age. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that the State presented sufficient evidence that the appellant knew about the existence and relevant terms of the emergency protection order even though the evidence showed he had successfully avoided service. The criminal appellate court concluded that a rational trier-of-fact could have inferred the appellant knew of the order at issue and that retaining his child violated that order. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.